From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: public key vs passwd authentication? Newsgroups: comp.security.ssh Date: Fri, 03 Oct 2003 18:48:41 GMTAnne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
as an aside, what is possible worst case scenario for OTP?
lets say
• client doesn't keep any state (other than encrypted password)
• server uses the same password addendas for all accounts
• challenge is predictable
• attacker can both evesdrop and impersonate the server
so the attacker
• evesdrops for a while .... collects some number of (possibly server-wide) server-side passphrase addendas
• takes to impersonating the server with challenge count of one and then signals transmission error/drop to the client once the response has been obtained.
Say the clients current count is actually at thousand, and the client doesn't track server-side counts ... the attacker (having obtained the hash for the number one password) now can calculate all of the (remaining, unused) one-time passwords for that account.
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: public key vs passwd authentication? Newsgroups: comp.security.ssh Date: Sat, 04 Oct 2003 15:11:23 GMTMichael Sierchio writes:
The vulnerability in the whole OTP scheme with iterative hashes ... is if any client hash value leaks that is for an iteration less than currently being used by a server.
the OTP description in the RFC ... has the client with a secret .... which is combined with something (salt) from the server to form a kind of password. The idea is that the client can use their same secret with lots of different servers ... each server providing unique server salts. The combined client-secret+sever-value is hashed repeatedly, the secret isn't used as a password ... each hash iteration is used as a password, just once.
On initialzation, the server provides the server side salt ... and gets back from the client, the value of the Nth hash. The core of this is that hashes are one-way functions that can't be reversed.
In the RFC, the description is that the server provides a predictable challenge, the server-side salt and the count N-1. The client can have the original client-secret sitting in an encrypted file that is available by decrypting with a client known passphrase.
Getting the server challenge, the client decrypts the file to obtain the client-secret (using a client passphrase), combines the client-secret with the server-side salt, and runs it iteratively thru the hash function N-1 times. The client then returns the N-1th iterative hash value as the (unique) response. The server gets the response, runs the hash function one more time and compares it with the Nth-iterative hash previously recorded.
If HASH(client response) == recorded hash .... then the server accepts the client as valid. The server then updates the recorded hash value, with the n-1 hash value and saves the client's current iterative value as n-1.
The threat scenario on OTP is to impersonate the server and get the client to cough up the first iterative hash value (or any iterative hash value that is lower in sequence than that already being used between the client and server).
While the original value is dependent on the combination of the client-side secret and the server-side value .... each OTP is only actually dependent on the immediately preceeding hash value (as demonstrated by the mechanism that the server uses to verify the response). Given that the attacker is able to obtain any earlier hash value in the sequence ... it never needs to find out the original client-side secret.
The attack is to impersonate the server and serve up a predictable challenge to the client with a count of one and the server-side value (obtained from previous evesdropping). If a server is using the same server-side value for all clients ... then it only needs to obtain that value once from a single evesdropping ... and be able to attack all of that server's clients thru server impersonation ... in each case spoofing a challenge with a (hash interation) count of one.
As in the previous post:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#0 public key vs passwd authentication
• client doesn't keep any state (other than encrypted client-side secret)
• server might use the same server-side salt for all accounts
• challenge is predictable (hash iteration count & server-side salt)
• attacker can both evesdrop and impersonate the server
if the server uses different/unique server-side value for each client,
then the attacker will have to evesdrop at least one transaction for
each client .... otherwise it only has to evesdrop a single client
transaction to get enuf information to impersonate the server for all
that server's clients.
The server impersonation attack is to send the client a challenge with the server-side value and the hash iteration count of one. Once it has the client's response for hash-iteration-one .... it can impersonate the client and provide a valid client response for any valid server challenge involving a hash iteration count greater than one.
If the client isn't keeping any state .... other than the originally encrypted client-secret ... then it may never realize that it has been attacked and spoofed into giving up the first hash iteration value (or any hash iteration value less than currently being used by the valid server).
The RFC described OTP such that the client only has to keep the original client-secret ... and an OTP infrastructure where the same client-secret can be used with an arbritrary number of different servers w/o divulging information.
However, if the client isn't keeping any state information, a questionable server can attack another server (if it has evesdropped and obtain that server's salt). Instead of sending to the client, its server-salt and the current count ... it sends the client a different server's salt and a count of one. It gets back the first iteration count for the server it is attacking and then signals the client a transmission error and repeats the challenge/response with its own salt/count. You might even imagine a black market in (stolen) first iteration hash values.
The attack is the same whether the client is using the same client-secret or different client-secrets for all servers .... since the attack is not dependent on the attacker ever finding out the client-secret; just the first iteration hash value (or any hash iteration value, less than the current iteration value used by the server).
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: public key vs passwd authentication? Newsgroups: comp.security.ssh Date: Sat, 04 Oct 2003 15:51:09 GMTMichael Sierchio writes:
was in response on the side topic of a major problem with the shared-secret password scheme is the requirement that the client has to have a unique shared-secret for every different security domain (bank, home, employeer, etc) .... otherwise information could leak allowing one organization to possibly compromise a different organization.
The assertion was that OTP allowed a client to only have to remember a single client-side secret .... with the implication that the same client-side secret could be used in an OTP paradigm and not allow leakage vulnerabilities between one organization and another organization (which in the shared-secret paradigm mandates a unique shared-secret password for each different security domain).
In theory, the server-side/organizational salt provided to the client, when combined with the client's secret/passphrase (whether it is a two level scheme with encrypted file decrypted by passphrase or directly used) then creates a series of OTP values unique to that client/server combination.
So the first part is to highlight that OTP is vulnerable to server impersonation ... where somebody knowing a specific server's value/salt can obtain the first iteration hash value from the client.
The next, is that if the client has no recorded state about each challenge/response event ... then one security domain can "attack" another security domain ... by using a challenge formulated to impersonate a server in another security domain .... getting the client to leak the first iteration hash.
The original side-thread was whether or not OTP helped in the multiple security domain environment .... alleviating the existing sever problem where human isn't equipped to remember unique shared-secret for every unique security domain; preventing cross-domain authentication information leakage ... enabling one security domain to attack a different security domain.
So the response(s):
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#50 public key vs passwd authentication?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#0 public key vs passwd authentication?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#1 public key vs passwd authentication?
outlined a vulnerability and exploit based on impersonating a server and obtaining a first iteration hash value.
so the client can take precautions that it is only talking to some valid server. however, within the original posting context of cross security domain leakage of authentication information (requiring unique shared-secrets for every security domain in the shared-secret paradigm), can one server impersonate another server as part of a cross domain exploit for obtaining leaked authentication information (the context of the original post)? So then the question is does OTP have any client-side countermeasures and/or awareness that it even occurred.
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: public key vs passwd authentication? Newsgroups: comp.security.ssh Date: Sat, 04 Oct 2003 16:30:08 GMT... everything i read claimed that OTP was designed as countermeasure against active evesdropping (of shared-secret passwords).
... everything i read claimed that OTP "challenge" was at least to address eliminating the client having to keep state information (didn't have to remember a current server's iternation value ... which could get out of sync ... or a server-side value/salt).
... the assertion in the original post implied that the client-passphrase plus server-side value/salt as the basis for the hash interations .... could be used to address cross security domain authentication information leakage; enabling the same client-side passphrase to be used with all servers.
so the question is ... given that there is no client-side state (getting everything predictably from the server) and OTP is going to be used as a solution for cross security domain authentication information leakage .... is there an attack/exploit where a valid server can impersonate a server in another security domain, obtain the first iteration hash value ... and the client not be aware that it happened.
The scenario initially made the claim about anybody being able to impersonate a server enabling the first iteration hash value exploit. A possible countermeasure is for the client to only execute OTP protocol when it knows it is talking to a valid server.
However, the original scenario concerned cross security domain authentication information leakage .... in which case the attack may be from a valid sever. The question is then can any valid server attack the client to obtain authentication information for a different security domain/server (and the attack go undetected).
The assumption is that any server can evesdrop on the traffic for any other server (in order to obtain the predictable information for impersonation).... since theoretically the original purpose of OTP is a countermeasure for evesdropping threat (if somebody chooses to eliminate the possibility of evesdropping, then a claim could be made that the original justification for OTP is also eliminated).
some of the thread pieces:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#49 public key vs passwd authentication?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#50 public key vs passwd authentication?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#51 public key vs passwd authentication?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#52 public key vs passwd authentication?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#55 public key vs passwd authentication?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#0 public key vs passwd authentication?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#1 public key vs passwd authentication?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#2 public key vs passwd authentication?
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Dual Signature Newsgroups: alt.security Date: Mon, 06 Oct 2003 15:10:15 GMTandyoz77@yahoo.com (Andy) writes:
business/corporate checks frequently have something printed on them stating that two (or more) signatures are required when the check amount is above some limit (say $5k).
FSTC when they were defining digitally signed business checks ... and inventing FSML ... financial signature markup language ... which was contributed to W3C and invovled into XML digital signature) ... had to support business check infrastructure of multipe digital signatures.
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: "Personal Computer" Re: Why haven't the email bobmers been shut down Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2003 04:10:44 GMTPeter Flass writes:
standard VM/370 had a system/priviledge definitions for what was shared segments .... privilege user loaded stuff into the appropriate place in their virtual address space ... and issued a privilege savesys command. Any user then could perform a loadsys and the appropriate virtual memory tables would be updated to reflect that they could be sharing the corresponding segments (read/only).
I did a paged map filesystem for CMS ... and put support into CMS to
load standard executables off of CMS page mapped areas ... with
including the ability to specify arbritrary shared segments.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#mmap
The problem is that the standard 360/370 genre of coding conventions have fixed addresses in their memory imaged formed (they have stuff that is called relocatable adcons .... which are addresses that are swizzeled by the loader when it brings the program off disk into memory (and therefor the virtual memory image of such applications are bound to specific virtual addresses).
The problem with only 256 possible segments and fixed addressing is an installation could define an arbritrary number of saved systems at arbritrary, but fixed virtual addresses. The administrative problems for installations was when they had users that wanted to use arbritrary combinations of different applications in the same virtual address space. The installation then had to make sure for different combinations of applications, they had unique and non-overlapping addresses. For large installations ... this could quickly lead to various sitatuons that just weren't possible ... and/or they had multiple different definitions for the same application ... that happened to be loaded at different addresses ... and could be used in various combinations simultaneously with specific other applications (it wasn't exactly the same as having every shared segment appear in every virtual address apace ... but the administrative nightmare for managing non-conflicting virtual addresses for large number of applications was pretty bad).
This kind of problem is somewhat mitigated in unix environments where a lot of applications are set up to run in unique/different address spaces ... with coordinated processing via pipes.
In any case, the infrastructure I had developed allowed CMS to load
shared images at arbritrary virtual addresses. The issue then was if
the same exact shared imaged existed in multiple different virtual
address spaces at different virtual addresses ... the application had
to be free of the traditional 360/370 fixed address paradigm. I
modified some number of applications to be fixed address free ... but
it required modifying the application code ... and then could mark it
for loading at any available free spot in a virtual address space
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#adcon
however, most of the applications tended to be bound to fixed addresses and so needed to be bound to predetermined address in each virtual address space it existed in.
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The IBM 5100 and John Titor Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2003 12:09:32 GMTcstacy@dtpq.com (Christopher C. Stacy) writes:
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: 3270 terminal keyboard?? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2003 23:54:58 GMTDave Daniels writes:
when PCs came along ... and pcterm with upgrade in PVM to keep state about what was in the pcterm buffer. PVM tried to understand if it had transmitted pieces of character strings already and if it might still be in the pcterm buffer .... in which case it had display controls to indicate display specific sequence of characters from the buffer (rather than sending the actual characters).
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The IBM 5100 and John Titor Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2003 22:32:31 GMTEric Smith <eric-no-spam-for-me@brouhaha.com> writes:
note that at the 5100 pages
http://www.brouhaha.com/~eric/retrocomputing/ibm/5100/
there are a number of additional references, including:
http://www.svec.org/hof/1994.html#friedl
the following from above:
Paul J. Friedl is known by many people as the Father of the Personal
Computer He was the chief architect and inventor of the world.s first
personal computer and also developed the predecessor of the modern
spreadsheet program in 1973, long before personal computers, as we
know them today, were introduced. He christened his computer 'SCAMP'
(Special Computer APL Machine Portable), and it became the father of
the IBM 5100 and the grandfather of the ubiquitous IBM PC, which was
introduced in August 1981, nearly eight years later The original SCAMP
is now in the Smithsonian Institute.
Dr. Friedl's 32-year career with the IBM Palo Alto Scientific Center
as a senior engineer and manager included pioneering work in
industrial process control, laboratory automation, knowledge-based
expert systems, distributed computing, and computer conferencing
systems. He also authored many technical papers and patent
disclosures. He invented the IBM People Sharing Information Network
(PSInet) Computer Conferencing System, which is being used by
kindergarten through 12th-grade educators throughout the country.
... snip ...
Note that the Palo Alto Science Center also had done APL\CMS and the APL microcode assist for the 370/145. The Cambridge Science Center had initially done CMS\APL by taking APL\360 and adapting it to CMS, large workspaces (i.e. more than 32k) and virtual memory (redo of the garbage collector and storage allocation). APL\CMS was effectively transferred to STL ... where they adapted it to also run on MVS ... calling it APL\SV.
This was a big contention leading to APL\SV. The APL purists had that it was totally free from any operating systems and/or real world influences. When Cambridge first adapted APL\360 for CMS\APL, they also added features allowing APL programs to invoke operating system APIs (doing things like read & write files as well as other operating system functions). There was a strong reaction that this contaminated the purity of APL. The "solution" was APL\SV (apl shared variables) ... where the operating system API capability was encapsulated in something called "shared variables" .... which provided the capability for APL to deal with the exterior world.
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The invention of the real-time interrupt Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2003 14:31:02 GMTRupert Goodwins writes:
The interrupts tended to result in entry into specific location in the supervisor ... and then the supervisor interrupt handler was responsible for saving the state at the time of the interrupt ... and decoding the meaning of the interrupt .... and invoking some process to handle that specific interrupt. Turns out from the supervisor side of interrupt handling ... the semantics were essentially identical whether it was an asynchronous I/O interrupt, asynchronous external interrupt or a supervisor call interrupt. In effect, the processing was identical ... even tho the cause possibly differed by whether it was software/synchronous or external/asynchronous.
One can conjecture that since the processing appeared identical, there was a tendency to refer to the paradigms with similar terminology ... even tho the cause for the interrupts differ.
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Cracking SSL Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2003 13:57:56 GMT"Roger Schlafly" writes:
basically, the browser has a table of public keys that are trusted by the client to validate public key certificates for servers. the servers basically contain a domain name and a public key.
typically a client browser 1) contacts a server, 2) gets back a server domain name certificate, 3) the browser validates the integrity of the server certificate with the public key from the internal browswer table of trusted public keys and 4) compares the certificate domain name with the domain name in the URL used to contact the server.
client certificates didn't come along until later. I believe that we
introduced the requirement for client certificates and mutual
authentication before SSL3. This was for the original payment gateway
and we wanted not only that the webserver validated the payment
gateway server (i.e. in the payment transaction with the payment
gateway, the payment gateway has the ssl role of the "server" ... not
the webserver) ... and the payment gateway server validate the
webserver (the webserver is the client of the payment gateway server).
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn2
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn3
the rise of aads
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#aads
was in large part having to do end-to-end due diligence on all business processes related to the original SSL, the uses of SSL, PKIs, certification authorities, etc and realizing that in (nearly) all (at least online) cases .... the certificates were redundant and superfluous duplication of other business operations.
SSL3 with "mutual" authentication (client and server) came along after the payment gateway stuff and the requirement for "client" certificates as part of the operation.
Note that the original idea was that SSL would be used for all of the
shopping experience .... from the initial contact of the merchant
website, thru all of the shopping experience, all the way thru
checkount and providing the credit card number.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#sslcerts
The problem was that the SSL overhead caused a five-fold decrease in the server shopping capacity ... so eventually SSL was eventually restricted to just the credit card phase for possibly something like 99.99 percent of the SSL uses around the world today.
So from the standpoint of "commonly used" .... the user may typically provide the initial, non-ssl URL for the shopping experience ... but when it comes to the most widely use of SSL ... the user clicks on a button at the shopping website to enter the SSL environment ... and most users pay little or no attention to the URL that the button serves up. A comon exploit is to be at a bogus shopping site (with no SSL) ... and then have a user hit the checkout button to enter the SSL session. The URL that the checkpoint at the bogus shopping site caughs up turns out to be identical to the domain name of the bogus shopping site ... and of course the SSL validation proves that the domain name in the (bogus) URL, in fact matches the domain name in the supplied certificate.
The issue, of course, is that the breadth of MITM protection specified
by the technical SSL description ... is significantly less than the
breadth of MITM exploits available to people wanting to do fraud. In
some ways, it is like saying that SSL specifies the security of the
bank vault door ... but washes its hands of any issue regarding bank
vault doors being placed in empty fields .... it isn't their fault
that the crooks can walk around the door since there are no walls,
floors, ceilings, etc.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#fraud
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Dreaming About Redesigning SQL Newsgroups: comp.databases.theory,comp.databases,comp.databases.object,alt.folklore.computers Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2003 19:01:24 GMTseunosewa@inaira.com (Seun Osewa) writes:
i have some memory of QBE presentation in cambridge in the early to mid 70s ... in advance of some amount of the System/R stuff.
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Dreaming About Redesigning SQL Newsgroups: comp.databases.theory,comp.databases,comp.databases.object,alt.folklore.computers Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2003 19:13:54 GMToops; and other query stuff from the same period ... also done on vm/370 and cms ... nomad, ramis, focus
and of course, 4th floor, 545 tech. sq
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#545tech
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: CPUs with microcode ? Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2003 14:40:52 GMTEric Smith <eric-no-spam-for-me@brouhaha.com> writes:
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Poor people's OS? Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.security,linux.redhat,comp.os.linux.misc Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2003 15:17:17 GMTRichard Pitt writes:
one order of magnitude (1 with single zero) is ten times or 1000percent, two orders of magnitude is hundred times (1 with two zeros) or 10000percent, three orders of magnitude is thousand times (1 with three zeros) or 100000percent.
magnitude times percent 1 10 1000 2 100 10000 3 1000 100000 4 10000 1000000or percent is "times" with two more zeros.
A question is does it become like the automobile or the telephone; the old stories about telephones and automobiles ... if they were ever to catch on ... every person would have to become a telephone operator or a chauffeur; ... in effect they drastically simplified both, allowing every person to, in fact, operate telephone and/or automobile w/o needing a separate, specially trained person.
there also has been the whole issue of automobile aftermarket products and customized automobiles ... or would most consumers eventually come treat automobiles like appliances.
slight drift .... some conferences have raised the issue regarding the prevailing, most common software was fundamentlly designed for relatively disconnected, desktop environment (say dedicated for stand-alone games) ... dropping it into a high-speed, all-the-time, 7x24, world-wide interconnected environment stresses it in ways that it was never designed to handle. For systems to operate with integrity in a specific paradigm ... it typically needs to have the fundamentals designed/built into from the origin; layering them on afterwards almost always results in significant faults.
There is some analogy with patches .... there was a industry study of a TV ad campaign from the late '70s .... where a particular vendor's copying machine was extremely prone to paper jams. They took out TV ads highlighting the fact that clearing paper jams in their product was much easier than in the competition products. However, the TV ads backfired ... constantly reminding people that the product had paper jams much more frequently than all other copiers. The current patch and virus update operations are somewhat analogous.
misc. discussions to buffer overflows, viruses, explots,
vulnerabilities and fraud:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#fraud
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Dreaming About Redesigning SQL Newsgroups: comp.databases,comp.databases.theory,comp.databases.object,alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2003 22:54:11 GMTpobrien@orbtech.com (Patrick K. O'Brien) writes:
see comment about RAMIS from 1969
http://www.decosta.com/Nomad/tales/history.html A Brief History of 4th generation languages
system/r was done on VM/370 .... before that (1969) RAMIS was done on modified version of CP/67 (precursor to VM/370) as per above URL. The modifiedd CP/67 by NCSS was moved to 370 generation machine .... and its subsequent NOMAD was in direct competition with the FOCUS (another RAMIS derivative) at Tymshare ... a modified VM/370 offering running on 370 hardware.
and as previously ... random system/r related stuff
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#systemr
some past references to commercial time-sharing offerings (ncss,
idc, tymshare, etc):
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#timeshare
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: log on windows xp with smartcard Newsgroups: alt.technology.smartcards Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2003 14:20:00 GMTDaniel James writes:
misc. public key, account based discussions
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#aads
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: which CPU for educational purposes? Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2003 18:14:31 GMT"Glen Herrmannsfeldt" writes:
a specific incident was one weekend I had time on machine someplace
... and one of the other machines in the machine room contained a copy
of the FS documents and specifications ... and they claimed that they had
a bunch of security procedures that I wouldn't be able to get around.
misc. FS references
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#futuresys
(25-30 years ago) I pointed out there were two countermeasures
1) put keylock on the front panel (they eventually moved all of it into service processor ... and added keylocks and password functions to the service processor)
and/or
2) provide support for encrypted filesystems with everybody having their own private key (which just added to the human factors shared-secret overload, although encrypted filesystems are now starting to show up)
recent post with lots of additional topic drift:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#23
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Dreaming About Redesigning SQL Newsgroups: comp.databases.theory,comp.databases,comp.databases.object,alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2003 23:10:08 GMT"Jim Mehl" writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Dreaming About Redesigning SQL Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2003 14:31:50 GMT"Jim Mehl" writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: which CPU for educational purposes? Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2003 15:04:27 GMTjmfbahciv writes:
one of the earlier issues is that if you are designing a system that is for purely personal use that isn't connected to anything else ... or at most is connected to a purely local, small, non-hostile collection of similar machines (aka similar to the purely batch system in machine room isolation) .... then the protection mechanisms are going to be totally different than what you would need for a world-wide, possibly all the time connected, somewhat anarchy, even being lugged around in quite public places.
the keylock/password on the front panel functions is only a countermeasure against limited, short term physical attack (aka nobody is looking for several minutes in the machine room). countermeasure for longer duration physical attack just about requires physically securing the actual data ... with one possibility being the encrypted filesystem scenario.
and even more drift, I think it was somebody at perkin-elmer that did a custom, locally loadable disk driver for CMS sometime in the 70s. Originally this was targeted at compression and saving disk space. There were a lot of pundits that believed it would aggravate CPU utilization. A not too surprising result (in retrospect) was that it reduced CPU utilization; the increase in CPU utilization performing the compression/decompression function was more than offset by the reduced physical blocks that had to be transferred ... and therefor the reduced CPU use by the I/O routine. I believe at least one of the encrypting filesystem drivers flowed from this work.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Is it possible to devise a public-key cipher with no flaws? Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2003 15:28:39 GMT"Panic" writes:
A PK business objective of using asymmetric ciphers is allowing one of the keys to be known ... but if none of the keying material is ever divulged (as in symmetric key), does that change the attacks? ... aka compare asymmetric cryptography and symmetric key cryptography on level playing field using same ground rules regarding no keying material being divulged; then compare the difference between PK business process use of asymmetric cryptography that allows some of the keying material to be divulged (against scenario where no keying material is divulged).
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: foundations of relational theory? - some references for the truly starving Newsgroups: comp.databases.theory,comp.databases.pick,alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2003 14:43:57 GMT"Paul Vernon" writes:
• ims hotstandby
• automated operator
and since then, I believe they have continued to have one hundred percent availability.
random past ims hot-standby posts:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#35a Drive letters
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#37 What is MVS/ESA?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#40 Comparison Cluster vs SMP?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#71 High Availabilty on S/390
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#77 Are mainframes relevant ??
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#92 MVS vs HASP vs JES (was 2821)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#128 Examples of non-relational databases
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#12 Amdahl Exits Mainframe Market
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#54 360 Architecture, Multics, ... was (Re: X86 ultimate CISC? No.)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#44 Where are IBM z390 SPECint2000 results?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#13 HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#14 HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#18 HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#47 five-nines
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#3 News IBM loses supercomputer crown
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#47 Sysplex Info
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#85 The demise of compaq
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#68 Blade architectures
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#73 Where did text file line ending characters begin?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#14 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#68 META: Newsgroup cliques?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002q.html#35 HASP:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#37 Calculating expected reliability for designed system
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#56 The figures of merit that make mainframes worth the price
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#11 how long does (or did) it take to boot a timesharing system?
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Are there any authentication algorithms with runtime changeable key length? Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2003 18:07:18 GMTjosb4@hotmail.com (jos sulistyo) writes:
a side issue .... independent of the implementation issues .... (given an algorithm that supported key substrings) .... is that longer key sizes are chosen because they are harder to determine. Using substrings of the long key for shorter versions of the same value .... exposes the longer key to piecewise discovery (i.e. you are making pieces of the long key vulnerable to discovery ... negating reason for having a longer key ... it is much easier to guess two 40 bit values than it is to guess a single 80 bit value).
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Good news for SPARC Newsgroups: comp.unix.solaris,comp.sys.sun.hardware,comp.sys.intel,comp.arch Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2003 15:36:20 GMT"Yousuf Khan" writes:
i vaque recollection of 30 some years ago at some auditorium at MIT where Gene Amdahl was describing what was to be his new company and there was some amount of heckling from the audience about it effectively being a fujitsu front.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Are there any authentication algorithms with runtime changeable key length? Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2003 19:00:48 GMTjosb4@hotmail.com (jos sulistyo) writes:
What would sort of be implied is that two extremely large numbers can be converted to bit-strings ... then abritrary subset of the bitstrings can be taken and then converted back to two (smaller) numerical values ... and that those two entirely new & arbritrary numerical values would also have some complex relationship?
Lets say I have a 100 digit number (A) that has a simple mathematical relationship to another number (B) ... lets say A is seven times B. The question is can I taken an arbritrary subset of digits from A and B ... where all subsets of A will always be seven times all subsets of B (for all possible A & B subsets and all possible As that are seven times some B)?
and what I was implying was that if you had need for different key lengths ... then you needed different keys (and some implementations require it in any case).
Lets say you have a ISO 14443 card with a chip that does EC/DSA digital signature authentication in a transit application. ISO 14443 is a standard for proximity cards where the chip doesn't actually have physical contacts for power but draws its power from RF energy in the air when in the vacinity of a 14443 reader (power-source). A transit application tends to have time constraints (i.e. avoid long lines at turnstyles in metro stations). Longer keys tend to require larger power-time profile than shorter keys (in contact configuration there is some trade-off possible between power and time ... i.e. more power to drive more circuits that would perform move complex operations faster).
so there is a somewhat general principle about security proporitional
to risk ... a little topic drift:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#61
which could imply that stronger security because of higher risk might require longer keys (and/or other measures).
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Good news for SPARC Newsgroups: comp.unix.solaris,comp.sys.sun.hardware,comp.sys.intel,comp.arch Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2003 13:27:18 GMTAlex Johnson writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Controversial paper - Good response article on ZDNet Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2003 13:43:35 GMT"George Ou" writes:
misc. past tiger/sherman posts
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#120 atomic History
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#85 V-Man's Patton Quote (LONG) (Pronafity)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#29 Review of Steve McConnell's AFTER THE GOLD RUSH
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#30 Review of Steve McConnell's AFTER THE GOLD RUSH
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#3 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#10 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#11 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#16 mainframe question
supposedly there was a quote from cheney with regard to going into gulf war II that the big problem was that Boyd had died in '97.
lots of boyd references:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subboyd.html#boyd2
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subboyd.html#boyd
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: CYLFAULT Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2003 14:09:51 GMTjohn.mckown@ibm-main.uiciinsctr.com (McKown, John) writes:
some pictures:
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/mss.html
misc. past 3850 posts
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#66 commodity storage servers
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#54 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#63 MVS History (all parts)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#55 Storage Virtualization
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#84 Questions on IBM Model 1630
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#3 PLX
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#7 Disk drives as commodities. Was Re: Yamhill
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#15 Disk drives as commodities. Was Re: Yamhill
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#18 Card Columns
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#21 Card Columns
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#29 360/370 disk drives
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Architect Mainframe system - books/guidenance Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2003 20:50:54 GMTthinkers_corner@ibm-main.hotmail.com (Thinkers Corner) writes:
padegs used to own the 360/370 "redbook" ... i.e. the
architecture book for the 360/370/etc ... it was done in CMS script
for a long time with conditionals for the subset that was printed
as the principles of operation publication (the full architecture
redbook had loads of stuff that didn't show up in the PoP)
http://izgudrojumi.lza.lv/eng/izgudrotaji/PadegsA.asp
at about the same time that ricky baum was hired into POK to be responsible for tightly-coupled (multiprocessor) architecture, my wife was hired to be responsible for loosely-coupled (aka cluster, sysplex, etc by any other name) architecture. She invented the peer-coupled shared data architecture (eventually used in IMS hot-standby and much later sysplex; we like to say she was only five years old at the time).
However, there was big problem in those days .... if the word "communication" showed up any place (even communication between processors) ... the VTAM team would claim ownership/responsibility. Fundamentally, VTAM was a terminal control program (one might consider that the TLA SNA was quite a bit of aggrandizement since 1) it wasn't a system, 2) it wasn't a network, and 3) it wasn't an architecture).
random multiprocessor topic drift:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#smp
random cluster topic drift:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hacmp
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Is this right? Question about SSL and PKI... Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2003 18:05:24 GMTOhaya <ohaya@NO_SPAM.cox.net> writes:
In the case of "loading" a certificate into a table ... you are bypassing the trust propagation gorp ... and loading the CA's public key (from the certificate) into a table of trusted public keys. Many products with SSL support typically ship with some number of trusted (CA) public keys already preloaded into their trusted public key table. The majority of the products will accept any certificate that can be authenticated with some public key in their table of trusted public keys (whether it was a preloaded trusted public key or a public key you specifically loaded).
So for the client browser to authenticate the server's certificate ... it must have the public key of the CA signing the server certificate (in its trusted public key table) ... or some CA public key from a trust hierarchy (the CA that signs your server certificate ... instead of having a self-signed certificate loaded into all the browsers, may have a CA certificate signed by some other CA ... which in turn has its public key loaded into the client browswers). So for the client browswers to authenticate your server .... either 1) the CA certificate for your MS certificate server (CA-Inhouse) is self-signed and has been loaded into all the client browser public key tables or 2) the CA certificate for your MS certificate server (CA-Inhouse) is signed by some other CA which has a public key loaded into the client browser trusted public key tables.
Similarly for the server to authenticate the client certificates ... it must have the public key of the CA signing the client certificates some how (pre)loaded into its table of trusted public keys (or the public key signing some CA-certificate in the client certificate trust hierarchy). One purely hypotethical scenario is that the MS certificate server (CA-Inhouse) has a CA server certificate that is not self-signed ... but possibly signed by microsoft ... and microsoft's CA certificate's public key is in the server's table of trusted public keys. Furthermore it is possible such a microsoft CA certificate is also not self-signed ... but is signed by some CA-commercial operation, who's public key is also loaded into the server's table of trusted public keys. Some such CA-commercial can also have a common trust root with the entity that is signing the client certificates.
The implication is that the server will accept as correctly authenticated any and all client certificates that have been signed by some validly recognized certifcate authority aka the server doesn't care what clients are connecting ... just so long as they have somebody's valid certificate. This may or may not be what you are really interested in. The client process for a server certificate is that the person types in a URL and gets back a SSL server certificate and checks to see if the domain name typed in corresponds with the domain name in the certificate.
One possibility from your description is that the server isn't checking to see if the person being authenticated isq actually a specific trusted person ... but is just checking to see if it is any random entity with any random valid certificate.
The authentication scenario ... say with RADIUS used by nearly all ISPs in the world for internet connectivity ... or a web server that has its client authentication stub to interface to RADIUS is that the connecting entity claims to be somebody ... which then RADIUS checks to see if that somebody is in the authentication table. The connecting entity then authenticates with regard to the claimed somebody with some authentication material. Then RADIUS typically provides the authorization information with regard to the authenticated entity. Most implementations in the world have a password (shared-secret) registered with RADIUS as authentication information. However, it is possible to enhance RADIUS to register a public key in place of a password. The client then performs a digital signature operation for authentication part of RADIUS ... and the server does a (certificate-less) digital signature authentication using the public key registered for the claimed entity.
There is a big different between any client in the world that just happens to have a valid certificate being allowed access .... and a client being able to proove that they are a specificly claimed entity with known access rights.
a little drift with authentication, SSL, PKI, WYTM, MITM, etc
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#4 Is cryptography where security took the wrong branch?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#7 Is cryptography where security took the wrong branch?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#8 Is cryptography where security took the wrong branch?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#9 Is cryptography where security took the wrong branch?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#10 Is cryptography where security took the wrong branch?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#11 Resolving an identifier into a meaning
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#14 Resolving an identifier into a meaning
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#25 WYTM?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#26 SSL, client certs, and MITM (was WYTM?)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#27 SSL, client certs, and MITM (was WYTM?)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#28 SSL, client certs, and MITM (was WYTM?)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#29 SSL, client certs, and MITM (was WYTM?)
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: hardware vs software security Newsgroups: alt.computer.security Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2003 22:58:56 GMTLeythos writes:
There are still some common issues like configurability. it used to be common (going back nearly 10 years) that there was some marked human factors difference in ease of configuring across different products.
For at least one of the products, it was a common and frequent failure because of the extreme complexity for filter specification that resulted in the inverse action of what was expected i.e. specifically permitting things that were expected to be not allowed. There has sometimes been some human factors studies about failing gracefully ... but this was so complex and was prone to failing in the worst possible way (doing the exact opposite of what was intended).
While hardware appliances might be less susceptible to roque software ... there might be some slight tendency for their ease-of-use & ease-of-configuration to be worse than general purpose software possibly aggravating configuration related mistakes.
As a result there has been some tendency to offload configuration related activities for hardware appliances to more general purpose platforms ... which then makes them software vulnerable to roque software with regardd to configuration operations. The other avenue is to eliminate as much of the configuration flexibility as possible.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: NSA chooses ECC Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2003 02:40:53 GMT"Roger Schlafly" writes:
both RSA and ec/dsa specifications are taken from X9 standards.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Cray to commercialize Red Storm Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2003 12:09:26 GMTnmm1@cus.cam.ac.uk (Nick Maclaren) writes:
A related impact this had was in managing multi-tasking levels and the associated virtual pages in a virtual memory environment.
During the late '60s and much of the '70s ... only very highly recently used tended to remain in real storage. Very high speed streaming paging devices were used to quickly move pages into and out of memory.
By the late 70s two things were starting to happen:
1) cpus were getting faster, much faster than the paging device
technology was getting faster (by factor of between 5-10)
2) significant increase in available memory in common configurations
because of #2, virtual page resident lifetimes became much longer ... even for relatively lightly used virtual pages. it was a good thing because the paging device technology wasn't keeping up with demand to move pages in/out of real storage.
in some sense during the '60s and '70s, i/o capacity was being used to compensate for real storage bottleneck. by the late '70s, the bottleneck was shifting from memory to i/o ... and you started to see the use of real storage to compensate for the emerging I/O bottleneck. This was somewhat assisted by the use of cpu caches .... much larger, less expensive memory technology could be used as processors got faster (i.e. large storage memory technology speed didn't have to track processor speed).
there are still some fundamental filesystem trade-off issues for things that might have high re-use probability and benefit from being cached ... vis-a-vis things that have little or no probability of being re-used. A single cache/copy filesystem paradigm can benefit high probability re-use data ... but degrades (compared to direct transfer) for low probability re-use data.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Macros and base register question Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2003 12:34:45 GMTvxp@ibm-main.sympatico.ca (Vic Petrone) writes:
In the early '70s, I had done a program (written in pli) that tried to do a detailed analysis of assembler program from the listing output ... it tracked register use in generated instructions and (tried to do) correlated registers generate for addressing with the fields, recognize possibly dead code, detailed flow analysis, recognize if/then/else structures .... and tried to generate equivalent high-level pseudo code.
One of the issues ... w/o implementing a full assembler ... just analysing the listing file didn't identify what structure a particular field was part of (although the generated code in the listing file did show which register was being used for addressability).
I also adopted it to work with the tss/360/370 assembler. The listing outputs were similar but the tss/360 assembler added the csect/dsect id as prefix to the storage displacement field i.e. in the hex code ... instead of just giving the storage displacement that corresponded to a variable field .... it would give the csect/dsect id of the structure that the variable was part of. Then just go to the table of csects/dsects and get the name of each structure that corresponded to the displacement id-identifier.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: ftp authentication via smartcard Newsgroups: alt.technology.smartcards Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2003 23:05:52 GMT"red" writes:
kerberos related stuff, start at
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
and under RFCs listed by select Term (term->RFC#)
it is possible to select "GSS" in the Acronym fastpath:
generic security service (GSS)
see also network services , security
3645 2853 2744 2743 2623 2479 2478 2203 2078 2025 1964 1961 1509 1508
it is also possible to scroll down to "Kerberos"
kerberos
see also authentication , security
3244 3129 2942 2712 2623 1964 1510 1411
clicking on a RFC number brings up the RFC summary in the lower frame ... clicking on the ".txt=nnnn" in the RFC summary retrieves that actual RFC.
misc. other kerberos references:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#kerberos
you can try search engine on "PC/SC" and "kerberos"; one such
reference that comes up is
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/security/topics/smrtcard/smrtcdcb/sec1/smartc03.asp
... another search engine hit:
http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/honey/talks/mcard-99-march/tsld027.htm
you might find the muscle website of interest:
http://www.linuxnet.com/
also try looking at ssh support for smartcards (and sftp). search engine
for "ssh" and "smartcard" ... one such search hit:
http://www.ssh.com/products/tectia/client/specifications.html
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Cray to commercialize Red Storm Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2003 00:00:39 GMT"Bill Todd" writes:
an offshoot of the SGI/XTP standardization work was a company called
protocol engines that designed a chip that did both XTP and TCP
protocol acceleration. a couple misc. refs from search engine:
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/context/21683/0
http://www.mentat.com/xtp/xtpdata.html
http://www.prz.tu-berlin.de/docs/html/prot/protocols/collaboration.html
one of the other design objectives was to be able to go directly between application address space and the protocol chip with no buffer copies (but possibly page fixing).
one of the issues was that an attempt was made to push it as "HSP" (high speed protocol) in ANSI/iso x3s3.3. However, it basically went directly from the transport interface to the LAN MAC interface. iso (and ansi) had a dictate that nothing could be standardized that violated the OSI model. Since HSP/XTP bypassed the traditional level 3/4 interface ... it violated OSI ... it also violated OSI by talking to LAN MAC interface (the problem being that LAN MAC sits somewhere in the middle of OSI level 3 ... and so anything that interfaces to MAC interface by definition violates the OSI model).
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Cray to commercialize Red Storm Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2003 14:56:06 GMTjonathan@Pescadero.DSG.Stanford.EDU (Jonathan Stone) writes:
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Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Cray to commercialize Red Storm Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2003 15:12:35 GMTrpw3@rpw3.org (Rob Warnock) writes:
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Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2003 08:57:38 -0700 Newsgroups: bit.listserv.vmesa-l Subject: DASD historyon Tue, 4 Nov 2003 13:58:21 -0700 wrote: >Does any one know of a web site that has the history of IBM mainframes disk >drives (and reference information)?
some amount of the GPD (adstar, err, whatever) website material disappeared about the time san jose became hitachi.
some misc. web. pages still around:
http://members.optushome.com.au/intaretro/2321DCD.htm
http://www.i-t-s.com/corporate/disk_drive_history.html
http://www.logicsmith.com/hdhistory.html
http://www.sdisw.com/dasd_capacity.html
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/2311.html
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9907/08/1971.idg/
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/datacell.html
http://mhhe.com/cit/uit3e/pages/chap6/profile6.html
past postings attempting to gather code-names:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#53 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#57 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#63 MVS History (all parts)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#31 index searching
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#3 PLX
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#7 Disk drives as commodities. Was Re: Yamhill
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Cray to commercialize Red Storm Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2003 20:13:04 GMTjonathan@Pescadero.DSG.Stanford.EDU (Jonathan Stone) writes:
from my rfc index:
1045 E
VMTP: Versatile Message Transaction Protocol: Protocol
specification, Cheriton D., 1988/02/01 (123pp) (.txt=264928)
(VMTP)
Not so much that I remember VMTP number ... but it is one off from
1044 S
Internet Protocol on Network System's HYPERchannel: Protocol
specification, Hardwick K., Lekashman J., 1988/02/01 (43pp)
(.txt=100836) (STD-45) (IP-HC)
which I had done a product implementation for. The base product was
getting about 44kbytes/sec thruput pretty much consuming a 3090
processor. The rfc1044 changes testing between 4341 and Cray (at Cray
Research) was getting 4341 channel media speed (mbyte/sec) using
extremely modest amount of 4341 (1mip) processor.
the rfc index entries can be found at
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
specific summary entries
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcidx3.htm#1044
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcidx3.htm#1045
select the ".txt=nnn" field retrieves the actual RFC.
any way other bits & pieces from long ago XTP/TAB meeting:
note that standard tcp requires minimum seven packet exchange
vmtp reduced that to minimum five packet exchange
xtp reduced it to a minimum three packet exchange
... not so much of an issue for large transfers .... but makes a difference if you have a reliable protocol being used for short transactions (as HTTP originally used TCP).
misc. past posts mentioning doing 1044 support:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subnetwork.html#1044
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: When nerds were nerds Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2003 14:30:33 GMT"Kingbarry2000" writes:
i got a student summer job programming. the univ. had a 709 with a 1401 for UR<->tape front-end to the 709. That spring that they got a 360/30 somewhat as part of getting some 360 experience in preparation for getting 360/67 for running tss/360.
the 1401 had a self-loading binary program that "MPIO" written on the card deck ... and handled the UR<->tape frontend task for 709. My student job was to replicate the function on 360/30. I was giving 360 principles of operation and various SRLs for 2400 tape, 1403 printer, 2540 reader/punch ... I got to invent multi-tasker, interrupt handlers, memory allocation, device drivers, etc.
Nominally, the computing center shutdown from 8am sat. until 8am monday morning (not only during the summer session, but during standard school year also). I was given the key for the machine room and allowed to work from 8am sat. until 8am monday with the whole machine to myself.
One of the first things I learned was at the 8am turn-over on sat. I would clean everything ... including taking the 2540 reader/punch apart ... empty the chad bin, clean the bruches, etc ... and then put everything back together again.
The 360/67 eventually arrived replacing the 709 ... however it was quite tramatic. TSS/360 wasn't ready yet ... so they ran os/360. Student fortran jobs had taken a couple seconds (at most each) on the tape<->tape under the 709 ibsys monitor. on release 7(?) ... a fortran student job was taking nearly hundred times longer elapsed time; effectively unit record speed ... plus really slow os/360 fortgclg three step job.
My access to the machine room continued into the school year where I got to play with os/360. Pulling a 48hr shift from 8am sat. to 8am monday and then doing monday classes was little bit of challenge (regularly going 60hrs with nothing but maybe 2-3 15 minute catnaps).
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: When nerds were nerds Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2003 18:54:33 GMTjmfbahciv writes:
the student keypunch room ... had 407, sorter (don't remember the number), and an interpreter (also don't remember the number). I have some vaque recollection about the interpreter could be cabled to something else ... possibly directly to the 407. The interpreter characters were too large to print one character per column ... to interpret 80 col. card it needed two rows ... possibly 60(?) chars on the top row and 20 chars on the 2nd row.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: When nerds were nerds Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2003 18:58:38 GMTjmfbahciv writes:
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: IEN 45 and TCP checksum offload Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2003 21:51:18 GMTjbennett@umunhum.stanford.edu (James Edward Bennett) writes:
some disucssion of preparation for the conversion:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#72 Difference between NCP and TCP/IP protocols
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#73 Difference between NCP and TCP/IP protocols
lots of other random past HOST, IMP, &/or NCP postings:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#37b Internet and/or ARPANET?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#39 Internet and/or ARPANET?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#44 Internet and/or ARPANET?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#67 Difference between NCP and TCP/IP protocols
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#74 Difference between NCP and TCP/IP protocols
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#4 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#54 NCP Help (re (D)ARPANET)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#67 Is Al Gore The Father of the Internet?^
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#81 36-bit MIME types, PDP-10 FTP
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#4 what makes a cpu fast
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#53 Pre ARPAnet email?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#23 more old RFCs
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#34 Processor Modes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#45 Processor Modes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#48 Author seeks help - net in 1981
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#2 Author seeks help - net in 1981
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#87 A new forum is up! Q: what means nntp
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#32 Buffer overflow
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002b.html#56 Computer Naming Conventions
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002b.html#58 ibm vnet : Computer Naming Conventions
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#6 medium term future of the human race
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#15 RFC Online Project
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#39 Why Use *-* ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#35 Why did OSI fail compared with TCP-IP?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#71 Coulda, Woulda, Shoudda moments?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#5 Coulda, Woulda, Shoudda moments?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#22 Why did OSI fail compared with TCP-IP?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#48 Why did OSI fail compared with TCP-IP?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#19 Vnet : Unbelievable
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#42 difference between itanium and alpha
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#46 difference between itanium and alpha
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#47 difference between itanium and alpha
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#13 COMTEN- IBM networking boxes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#59 unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#60 Bitnet again was: unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#62 ARPAnet again: Bitnet again was: unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#18 Multiple layers of virtual address translation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#17 Why did TCP become popular ?
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Date: Sat, 08 Nov 2003 13:41:20 -0700 Newsgroups: bit.listserv.vmesa-l Subject: hung/zombie users ... long boring, wandering storyAt the science center
As part of the work on fine grain locking and multiprocessing support ... charlie had to restructure some of the kernel facilities ... one such was the serialization function.
Earlier as an undergraduate ... i had done all this performance work, pathlength stuff, dynamic adaptive scheduling, fair share, page replacement algorithm, page i/o rewrite, etc... but also had done something called pageable kernel ... where i created a dummy/system user with a dummy virtual address space that was mapped to the kernel. The kernel was carefully built so routines that were to be part of the pageable kernel area .... were carefully broken into no larger than 4k and no module crossed a physical 4k boundary ... and all of the pageable routines were located at the end of the kernel. At boot/ipl ... startup would unpin all the kernel storage above a certain real address ... and allow it to page in/out. This code never shipped in cp/67 product.
However, as part of charlie's rewrite of the cp/67 serialization function ... he also cleaned up some number of zombie process situations. When getting rid of a process ... the procedure had been if there was any ongoing asynchronous activity (evidenced by some control block), the force of the process would be delayed until the activity finished (so there was no dangling activity/references left around after the process was totally gone ... which would typically crash the kernel). Charlie rewrote all that ... so that all sorts of asynchronous activity was re-assigned to the "system" user ... various things patched up ... the process was gone ... and any hanging activity would be associated with the system process which never goes away. The side effect of all this work (starting out to restructure the kernel serialization process for multiprocessing) eliminated lots of system crashes and most known instances of zombie/hung processes.
Along the way .. i started keeping up all the mp modifications for the routines that i was heavily working with & modifying (paging, scheduling, dispatching, etc). Unrelated to MP stuff, I also did restructure of cms and cp to add support for paged mapped filesystem ... and some restructing of shared memory across processes ... a package of stuff I write a report on called Virtual Memory Management.
In the mean time ... the development group goes off and starts work on VM/370 .... which retains much of the existing CMS structure ... but significantly redesigns and rewrites much of the CP kernel. In that process ... almost all of the scheduling and resource management stuff (some of which had already shipped in CP/67) I did was dropped.
Eventually, the science center replaces the aging 360/67
multiprocessor with a uniprocessor 370/155 and we start porting lots
of the stuff dropped in the cp67->vm370 rewrite to the vm/370
kernel. Much of this was accomplished by the early release 2 vm/370
time-frame ... and besides running at the science center was being
installed at a number of internal locations. One major installation
were the HONE centers (supported all the field, branch, sales,
marketing, etc people around the world)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hone
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#timeshare
HONE applications were heavily APL based ... but periodically required
some performance assist from applications written in Fortran. At that
time, the only way to get shared pages/segments was via the "IPL"
command and definitions sembled in the SNT kernel routine. APL was
extremely large amount of code & workspaces ... that needed to be
mapped into shared memory for efficiency. However the IPL requirement
made it extremely difficult to transition from an IPL'ed CMS+APL
infrastructure to a CMS+fortran infrastructure (and back). Part of the
release two "VMM" changes was the page mapped file system, additional
CMS routines restructured to reside in shared pages, support for
allowing shared pages to be defined as part of loading an executable
from a page mapped file system. This allowed HONE to easily transition
back and forth between APL and Fortran applications in a shared
segment environment (as easily as a non-shared environment).
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#mmap
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#adcon
Along the way, there was extensive performance profiling work going on at the science center (somewhat the inception of capacity planning) as well as extensive performance testing and benchmarking. As part of the performance profiling, testing, benchmarking, etc an automated benchmarking procedure was developed. This also required the creation of something called automated operator. A script of benchmarks is defined which includes 1) specific workload, 2) specific kernel build, 3) specific parameter settings, 4) reboot between benchmarks, 5) automated restart and execution. The creation of the automated operator concept was essential to being able to set up 48hr run of benchmarks over the weekend and allowed it to effectively run unattended.
The automated operator and a small subset of the VMM work (called discontiguous shared segments) was picked up by the development group and released in VM/370 release 3.
Also during this period I was working with Endicott on microcode
enhancements for virgil/tully ... which eventually was released as
ECPS on the 370 138 and 148.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#21 370 ECPS VM microcode assist
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#27 370 ECPS VM microcode assist
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#28 370 ECPS VM microcode assist
At the same time, I was working on a 5-way SMP project code named VAMPS, that involved microcode 370 processors. For this design ... I was using most of my performance enhancement from CP/67 days ... which retained their restructuring for SMP operations. I was also dropping large amounts of the dispatcher, scheduler, paging subsystem, and interrupt handling into microcode. It was sort of like a cross between an advanced ECPS ... plus somewhat akin to (later) intel 432 (except much of multiprocessing support was in microcode rather than silicon). All the processors could run virtual processes and the multiprocessed microcode ... if the multiprocessed microcode could not continue, it would queue a high level service request (interrupt) for the kernel ... and then search for some other work to do. In this design, only one processor could be executing the software CP kernel at a time. This was somewhat akin to the prevalent kernel spin-lock implementations ... with the following difference:
So in parallel with this ... I was asked to release a Resource
Manager product (lots of stuff I had done as undergraduate and some of
which had been previously released in CP/67):
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#45 VM/370 Resource Manager
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#fairshare
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#wsclock
In preparation for the Research Manager there are something like 2000 benhcmarks defined with an extremely broad range of resources, system parameters, and workloads. In preparation for that, there were some serious stress test workloads defined and run (one scenario so overloaded the paging system that the average service time to handle single page request was taking one second elapsed time, when running at 600 page i/o per second). These workloads turned out were guaranteed to cause vm/370 to fail. So now, a little reset ... and go back and resurrect Charlie's CP/67 restructuring design for MP serialization support in a fine-grain locking implementation. None of the code actually applied ... but the general principle applied ... rewrite the serialization routine to go thru all the forms of asynchronous kernel and control block activity ... reset them and/or re-assign to the system process (while this didn't ship in cp/67 ... it was picked up as part of the vm/370 kernel rewrite for pageable kernel routines). Eventually we got to the point where we could no longer create vm/370 failures (which previously could be reliably created every time with the stress test benchmarks) ... and as a side effect, all hung/zombies went away.
We then start a series of 2000 (automated) benchmarks ... the first
1000 or so were predetermined. There was an APL analytical/statistical
model of VM performance ... which was in part calibrated at the same
time we were calibrating the implementation with the first 1000 or so
benchmarks. The APL code was then set up so it had the summary results
of all benchmarks to date ... and control over all possible benchmark
parameters (workload, system configuration & resources,
performance turning parameters, etc) and was programmed to make sure
there was statistical coverage of workload & operational envelope
... and then search for workload/operational points that might be
anomalies and/or the system couldn't handle correctly. In all, 2000
benchmarks were run in this series as part of preparing the
Resource Manager for product release:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#bench
So the Resource Manager released as the first IBM "SCP" charged for product (prior to that application code was being licensed ... but there hand't yet been charge for licensed "SCP" code, I get the privilege of working with business people for six months establishing framework for SCP licensing and charging).
The official, SMP, multiprocessing support is ramping up somewhat in parallel with finishing off the Resource Manager for release. I take a version of the code to-date and integrate it and rewrite sections against VM/370 release 3 ... and install it for production operation at major internal HONE centers. As it is getting nearer to releasing the standard code as part of Release 4 VM/370 ... a problem appears.
The framework for SCP license/charging has basic hardware support is still "free" ... but everything else can be charged for. The Resource Manager is already released as licensed/charged for product. The software adaption of the VAMPS implementation (aka numerous low-level kernel functions parallelized, but low-usage, majority of kernel still behind a single kernel lock ... which I coin a term and call a bounce lock).
To simulate the VAMPS microcode interrupt implementation ... the parallelized low-level software code may attempt to obtain the kernel lock ... but if it fails ... instead of spinning it queues an extremely lightweight service request against the kernel lock ... and goes off and try and find other work to do.
In any case ... this implementation is dependent on a lot of the
(multiprocessor sensitized) code I carried forward from CP/67 and is
now part of the Resource Manager. For release 4, they
eventually decide to take approximately 80 percent of the code that
had been in the Resource Manager and move it into the base
product (in order to have free SMP hardware support w/o a prerequisite
on charged-for, licensed software). There continues to be release 4
Resource Manager that is 1/5th the code of the release 3
Resource Manager (however the price doesn't change).
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#smp
A side-effect is that all the serialization, system failure fixup, and
hung/zombie fixups are incorporated into the base system. Ok, the tale
is close to done ... so far converge of fine-grain locking code and
Resource Manager benchmarking for the initial round of
eliminating all possible zombies. misc problem determination
references ... including zombie diagnostics:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#dumprx
By this time, I'm hacking around the disk engineering lab (bldg. 14) and the disk product test lab (bldg. 15). They have all these test cells (each test cell is heavy steel wire mesh cage with heavy duty combo padlock, each inside a secure machine room, inside a secure bldg, inside a fenced plant site). They have a problem that they are testing hardware that generates lots & lots of errors and even errors that violate all ground rules of machine operation. As a result they have to schedule stand-alone machine time, one testcell at a time.
An example is mean-time-between-failure of operating a single test
cell connected to a machine running MVS is 15 minutes (before MVS
hangs or fails and requires reboot). So I take on the challenge of
redoing I/O subsytem so that multiple testcells can be operated
simultaneously while the rest of the machine is used for standard
services. It takes awhile ... but eventually the system is running on
all processors in bldg. 14 and bldg. 15. This closes a number of
additional holes where misbehaving hardware can result in system
crashes and/or zombies.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#disk
About this time, a PTF is released against the standard system. Apparently somebody has diagnosed some customer system failure as a serialization problem and puts a fix into mainline dispatcher code to delay processing given certain state combinations.
All of a sudden zombies start re-appearing.
For local systems, I make sure that fix is not applied ... and try and find out what raised the reason for this particular fix/PTF to be generated in the first place.
Some side effects of having all the testcell work going on under operating system
1) labs tend to get early processors ... they get one of the first engineering 3033s ... to verify 3033 with disks. the disk division has been doing a lot of air bearing simulation work in preparation for 3380 floating heads. Most of these runs on being done on the research 195 in bldg. 28. However, there is a pretty long queue constantly waiting for the 195 ... so the amount of 195 time is pretty low. For lots of things the 3033 has nearly the same processing thruput as the 195. The engineering 3033 is about five percent cpu loaded support testcell work. We get the air bearing simulation work moved to the engineering 3033 and turn around goes up enormously.
2) monday morning I get a call that the time-sharing performance on the machine in bldg. 15 product test lab has gone to pieces and they want to know what I did over the weekend. They claim they had done absolutely nothing. On further investigation ... I find out that over the weekend they had replaced a 3830 control unit supporting 16 3330 drives with a 3880 control unit (as it turns out ... we are still six months away from first customer ship of 3880s).. After much more detailed analysis ... identify that 3880 has a serious performance problem supporting multiple drives. All the testing up until this point had been with single drive environment. This was first time that a 3880 had been configured with multiple drives. The fundamental problem was that the 3830 controller had been a very fast horizontal microcode engine. The 3880 was a fast hardware assist for data flow .... but a relatively slow vertical microcode engine (jib-prime) for control functions. The additional latency for control functions was having all sorts of disastrous and unanticipated effects on overall thruput. Some amount of this gets fixed prior to first customer ship.
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: What makes a mainframe a mainframe? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2003 01:10:06 GMTrsteiner@visi.com (Richard Steiner) writes:
was that the batch systems basically had a paradigm that the person responsible for the program wasn't present; while the systems that originated for interactive use tended towards a paradigm that the programmer/user was present.
The implications were that when something went wrong ...
a) the interactive systems tended to punt and hopefully put up and error message that possibly some human would respond to;
b) while the batch systems evolved a set of facilities to automagically handle all sorts of conditions .... since the assumption was that the responsible humans weren't going to be present.
the appearance of the web then presented something of the dicotomy ... both the client based stuff and the server based stuff were formed on platforms that trace their heritage to interactive, desktop operation; however, while the operational requirements for the client stuff tend to somewhat match up with the interactive computing paradigm ... the server stuff tends much more towards the batch computing paradigm aka people aren't necessarily present to constantly hand-hold every little, itsy-bitsy thing that happens.
lots of past mainframe threads:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#31 Big I/O or Kicking the Mainframe out the Door
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#32 Big I/O or Kicking the Mainframe out the Door
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#00 Big I/O or Kicking the Mainframe out the Door
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#01 Big I/O or Kicking the Mainframe out the Door
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#35 mainframe CKD disks & PDS files (looong... warning)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#53 How Do the Old Mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#54 How Do the Old Mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#55 How Do the Old Mainframes Compare to Today's Micros?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/95.html#00 old mainframes & text processing
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#7 Why Do Mainframes Exist ???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#8 Why Do Mainframes Exist ???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#14 mainframe tcp/ip
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#27 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#28 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#29 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#31 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#32 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#33 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#34 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#35 Mainframes & Unix (and TPF)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#36 Mainframes & Unix (and TPF)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#38 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#39 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/97.html#4 Mythical beasts (was IBM... mainframe)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#63 Mainframe operating systems
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#68 Mainframe operating systems
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#71 Mainframe operating systems
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#75 Mainframe operating systems
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#76 Mainframe operating systems
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#77 Mainframe operating systems
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#78 Mainframe operating systems
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#79 Mainframe operating systems
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#88 ASP (was: mainframe operating systems)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#0 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#1 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#3 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#4 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#5 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#8 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#9 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#10 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#11 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#26 S-P-F (was Mainframe operating systems)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#85 Mainframe power failure (somehow morphed from Re: write rings)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#38 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#39 WHAT IS A MAINFRAME???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#44 WHAT IS A MAINFRAME???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#45 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#46 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#47 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#48 WHAT IS A MAINFRAME???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#49 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#50 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#51 WHAT IS A MAINFRAME???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#52 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#54 WHAT IS A MAINFRAME???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#56 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#59 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#63 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#64 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#65 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#66 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#67 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#68 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#69 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#70 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#71 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#72 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#73 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#74 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#75 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?></pre>
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#76 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#79 Unisys vs IBM mainframe comparisons
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#80 Unisys vs IBM mainframe comparisons
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#81 Unisys vs IBM mainframe comparisons
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#82 Unisys vs IBM mainframe comparisons
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#83 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#84 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#0 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#1 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#7 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#9 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#10 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#11 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#12 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#13 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#14 FW: RS6000 vs IBM Mainframe
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#8 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#22 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#37 FW: NEW IBM MAINFRAMES / OS / ETC.(HOT OFF THE PRESS)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#11 Amdahl Exits Mainframe Market
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#12 Amdahl Exits Mainframe Market
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#44 Options for Delivering Mainframe Reports to Outside Organizat ions
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#49 Options for Delivering Mainframe Reports to Outside Organizat ions
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#55 How Many Mainframes Are Out There
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#67 IBM mainframe reference online?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#48 Common uses of multiprogramming on mainframes computer? Help!! Please
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#50 Common uses of multiprogramming on mainframes computer? Help!! Please
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#52 Common uses of multiprogramming on mainframes computer? Help!! Please
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#68 Common uses of multiprogramming on mainframes computer? Help!! Please
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#4 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#5 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#6 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#7 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#8 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#9 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#11 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#12 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#13 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#14 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#17 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#18 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#19 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#20 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#21 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#23 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#24 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#25 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#30 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#32 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#33 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#37 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#41 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#50 What makes a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#53 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#54 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#55 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#57 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#3 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#7 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#8 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#10 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#11 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#13 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#16 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#18 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#79 a.f.c history checkup... (was What specifications will the standard year 2001 PC have?)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#4 IBM Mainframe at home
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#5 IBM Mainframe at home
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#6 IBM Mainframe at home
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#7 IBM Mainframe at home
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#8 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#9 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#10 IBM Mainframe at home
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#11 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#12 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#13 IBM Mainframe at home
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#14 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#16 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#17 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#18 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#19 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#20 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#21 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#23 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#24 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#25 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#28 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#29 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#30 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#33 LISTSERV(r) on mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#36 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#37 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#38 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#40 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#43 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#46 IBM Mainframe at home
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#53 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#54 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#4 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#6 LISTSERV(r) on mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#33 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#53 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#54 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#55 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#57 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#10 Least folklorish period in computing (was Re: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#52 Mainframes and "mini-computers"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#60 Mainframes and "mini-computers"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#3 Why are Mainframe Computers really still in use at all?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#16 Why are Mainframe Computers really still in use at all?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#23 Why are Mainframe Computers really still in use at all?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#25 Why are Mainframe Computers really still in use at all?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#47 Why are Mainframe Computers really still in use at all?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#68 Why are Mainframe Computers really still in use at all?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#19 PowerPC Mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#20 PowerPC Mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#21 PowerPC Mainframe
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#24 PowerPC Mainframe
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#27 Why are Mainframe Computers really still in use at all?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#56 Server and Mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#57 Server and Mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#62 Server and Mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#14 NASA MOC (mainframe mission operations computer) being powere d
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#15 Large Banking is the only chance for Mainframe
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#16 Large Banking is the only chance for Mainframe
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#41 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#66 Mainframe Spreadsheets - 1980's History
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#67 Mainframe Spreadsheets - 1980's History
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#73 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#0 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#1 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#2 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#4 Mainframe Spreadsheets - 1980's History
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#11 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#12 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#14 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#15 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#16 Home mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#19 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Mainframe
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#20 The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Mainframe
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#37 Newbie: Two quesions about mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#54 Newbie: Two quesions about mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#63 Newbie: Two quesions about mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#9 Mainframe System Programmer/Administrator market demand?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#10 Mainframe System Programmer/Administrator market demand?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#11 Mainframe System Programmer/Administrator market demand?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#32 Mainframe System Programmer/Administrator market demand?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#36 mainframe
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#15 Mainframe Tape Drive Usage Metrics
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#56 The figures of merit that make mainframes worth the price
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#60 The figures of merit that make mainframes worth the price
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#52 HSM Functionality for Microsoft, using the Mainframe as the
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#34 Interrupt in an IBM mainframe
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#46 Slashdot: O'Reilly On The Importance Of The Mainframe Heritage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#47 Slashdot: O'Reilly On The Importance Of The Mainframe Heritage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#50 Slashdot: O'Reilly On The Importance Of The Mainframe Heritage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#56 Obsolete mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#29 Architect Mainframe system - books/guidenance
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia, 20th anniv: https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: What makes a mainframe a mainframe? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2003 16:01:03 GMTrsteiner@visi.com (Richard Steiner) writes:
my wife was chief architect for amadeus for a short time ... until she got removed ... essentially for preferring x.25 in europe over sna (x.25 won out eventually anyway).
some amount of past pars, acp, sabre, tpf (transaction processing
facility, name change in part because acp ... airline control program
was being used by some financial transaction networks):
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#29 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#17 Old Computers
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#100 Why won't the AS/400 die? Or, It's 1999 why do I have to learn how to use
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#103 IBM 9020 computers used by FAA (was Re: EPO stories (was: HELP IT'S HOT!!!!!))
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#136a checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#152 Uptime (was Re: Q: S/390 on PowerPC?)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#20 How many Megaflops and when?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#61 VM (not VMS or Virtual Machine, the IBM sort)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#65 oddly portable machines
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#21 Competitors to SABRE? Big Iron
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#22 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#20 Competitors to SABRE?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#26 Disk caching and file systems. Disk history...people forget
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#28 Competitors to SABRE?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#32 Competitors to SABRE?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#34 Competitors to SABRE?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#37 Competitors to SABRE?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#38 Competitors to SABRE?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#48 Competitors to SABRE?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#51 Competitors to SABRE?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#58 Disk drive behavior
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#37 John Mashey's greatest hits
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#69 Block oriented I/O over IP
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#2 Block oriented I/O over IP
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#35 Did AT&T offer Unix to Digital Equipment in the 70s?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#45 Did AT&T offer Unix to Digital Equipment in the 70s?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#46 The Alpha/IA64 Hybrid
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#47 The Alpha/IA64 Hybrid
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#49 Did AT&T offer Unix to Digital Equipment in the 70s?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#50 Did AT&T offer Unix to Digital Equipment in the 70s?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#76 Other oddball IBM System 360's ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#17 I hate Compaq
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#0 TSS/360
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#3 News IBM loses supercomputer crown
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#9 IBM Doesn't Make Small MP's Anymore
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#2 Computers in Science Fiction
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#3 Why are Mainframe Computers really still in use at all?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#12 Why did OSI fail compared with TCP-IP?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#43 IBM doing anything for 50th Anniv?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#63 Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#83 HONE
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#28 ibm history note from vmshare
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#83 Summary: Robots of Doom
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#67 Tweaking old computers?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#29 why does wait state exist?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#28 TPF
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#58 AMP vs SMP
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#48 InfiniBand Group Sharply, Evenly Divided
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#30 difference between itanium and alpha
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#67 unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#30 One Processor is bad?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#32 One Processor is bad?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#37 Lisp Machines
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#2 Fix the shuttle or fly it unmanned
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#3 Ping: Anne & Lynn Wheeler
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#4 IBM Manuals from the 1940's and 1950's
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia, 20th anniv: https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: What makes a mainframe a mainframe? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2003 01:11:09 GMTAnne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
in the above ... the referenced core 2000 benchmarks for preparing the Resource Manager product for initial release ... they took three months elapsed time to run. these days ... possibly only high-end chips have such extensive testing.
the referenced rewrite of the i/o subsystem so it never failed regardless of the i/o serverity and the number of concurrent testcells was in an environment where standard MVS with a single testcell had MTBF of 15 minutes.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Rant (Re: Programmer's unpaid overtime) Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2003 05:39:44 GMTCharles Richmond writes:
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Call-gate-like mechanism Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2003 02:58:58 GMT"Glen Herrmannsfeldt" writes:
370 added high resolution timers in the hardware that were accessed via special instructions. low resolution timer in location 80 was kept for awhile ... but was depreciated.
when i was an undergraduate ... I tried to write programs that would use drive the 2702 terminal control unit so that it could automagically recognize terminal type .... aka 2702 had SAD commands that could dynamically associated specific line scanner with specific port. The problem turned out that they took some short cuts in the implementation ... and hardwired oscillator to each port .... so while you could switch the 2741 and TTY line scanners to any port ... the 134 & 110 baud rates were hardwired to each port.
somewhat as a result, we started a project to reverse engineer the 360 channel and build our own terminal controller using an Interdata/3 as initial base ... with objective of doing both automatic speed and automatic terminal recognition.
One of the early bugs we ran into was that if the timer is not able to
update location 80 between two timer tics ... it redlights and hangs
the machine. Having a controller hold the channel and therefor the
main storage bus for longer than a timer tic interval (13.mics on
360/67) would redlight and hang the machine. random refs including
blaming us for originating the ibm plug compatible controller (PCM)
business:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#360pcm
370 (30 some years ago) introduced a 64bit timer infrastructure that had time of day clock register, a clock comparator register (value that when TOD matched caused an interrupt), and a cpu timer register. with low order bit of the high word defined as slightly more than one second (1024/1000).
detailed discussion of tod, clock comparator, & cpu timer on current
generation machines (although I don't think the definition has changed
since the original 370 some 30 years ago):
http://publibz.boulder.ibm.com/cgi-bin/bookmgr_OS390/BOOKS/DZ9ZR001/4.6?SHELF=DZ9ZBK01&DT=20020416112421
and description from CPU Timer:
http://publibz.boulder.ibm.com/cgi-bin/bookmgr_OS390/BOOKS/DZ9ZR001/4.6.4?SHELF=DZ9ZBK01&DT=20020416112421
The CPU timer is a binary counter with a format which is the same as
that of bits 0-63 of the TOD clock, except that bit 0 is considered a
sign. The CPU timer nominally is decremented by subtracting a one in
bit position 51 every microsecond. In models having a higher or lower
resolution, a different bit position is decremented at such a
frequency that the rate of decrementing the CPU timer is the same as
if a one were subtracted in bit position 51 every microsecond. The
resolution of the CPU timer is such that the stepping rate is
comparable to the instruction-execution rate of the model.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Call-gate-like mechanism Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2003 07:03:43 GMTTerje Mathisen writes:
there are two timers referenced:
1) 360, location 80 timer, 32 bits, bit 23 tics 300 times per second. on machines with high resolution timer ... bit 31 actually tics 300*256 times per second. total interval is the same on all machines whether or not high resolution time is installed.
2) 370, 64-bits, operates as if bit 51 tics every microsecond ... which works out to bit 31 (low bit of the first word) tic'ing once every 1024/1000 second ... aka the first 32 bits are approximately a one second timer ... counting approximately four billion seconds.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Call-gate-like mechanism Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2003 15:03:57 GMTrobertwessel2@yahoo.com (Robert Wessel) writes:
URL was included in the above that pointed to 4.6 Timing in the current
principles of operation ... i.e. (also from above):
http://publibz.boulder.ibm.com/cgi-bin/bookmgr_OS390/BOOKS/DZ9ZR001/4.6?SHELF=DZ9ZBK01&DT=20020416112421
the full description for TOD clock 4.5.1.1. Format
http://publibz.boulder.ibm.com/cgi-bin/bookmgr_OS390/BOOKS/DZ9ZR001/4.6.1.1?SHELF=DZ9ZBK01&DT=20020416112421&CASE=
from above:
The TOD clock is a 104-bit register. It is a binary counter with the
format shown in the following illustration.
1 microsecond___
.
____________________ _ ____ _________________
| | | | |
|____________________|_|____|_________________|
0 51 64 103
The TOD clock nominally is incremented by adding a one in bit position
51 every microsecond. In models having a higher or lower resolution, a
different bit position is incremented at such a frequency that the
rate of advancing the clock is the same as if a one were added in bit
position 51 every microsecond. The resolution of the TOD clock is such
that the incrementing rate is comparable to the instruction-execution
rate of the model.
....
a more detailed description is at programming notes in 4.6.1.5 TOD
Programmable Register (which goes into some detail of STORE CLOCK
EXTENDED):
http://publibz.boulder.ibm.com/cgi-bin/bookmgr_OS390/BOOKS/DZ9ZR001/4.6.1.5?SHELF=DZ9ZBK01&DT=20020416112421&CASE=
from above:
13. At some time in the future, new models will use a carry from bit
position 0 of the TOD clock to increment an additional eight-bit
binary counter. STORE CLOCK EXTENDED will store the contents of this
counter in byte position 0 of its storage operand. A variation of SET
CLOCK will set the counter, as well as the TOD clock. Variations of
SET CLOCK COMPARATOR and STORE CLOCK COMPARATOR will manipulate a
comparable byte at the left of the clock comparator. These actions
will allow the TOD clock to continue to measure time within the
standard epoch after the current 143-year limit caused by a carry from
bit position 0 has been exceeded, and they will allow continued use of
the clock comparator. It may be desired to have programs that process
16-byte STORE CLOCK EXTENDED operands take these future developments
into account.
...
7.5.113 STORE CLOCK
http://publibz.boulder.ibm.com/cgi-bin/bookmgr_OS390/BOOKS/DZ9ZR001/7.5.113?SHELF=DZ9ZBK01&DT=20020416112421
7.5.114 STORE CLOCK EXTENDED
http://publibz.boulder.ibm.com/cgi-bin/bookmgr_OS390/BOOKS/DZ9ZR001/7.5.114?SHELF=DZ9ZBK01&DT=20020416112421
STCKE D2(B2) [S] The current value of bits 0-103 of the TOD clock is stored in byte positions 1-13 of the sixteen-byte field designated by the second-operand address, provided the clock is in the set, stopped, or not-set state. Zeros are stored in byte position 0. The TOD programmable field, bits 16-31 of the TOD programmable register, is stored in byte positions 14 and 15. The operand just described has the following format: _____ _____________________________ __________ | | |Programm- | |Zeros| TOD Clock |able Field| |_____|_____________________________|__________| 0 8 112 127 When the clock is stopped, zeros are stored in the clock value in positions to the right of the rightmost bit position that is incremented when the clock is running. The programmable field still is stored. When the value of a running clock is stored, the value in bit positions 64-103 of the clock (bit positions 72-111 of the storage operand) is always nonzero; this ensures that values stored by STORE CLOCK EXTENDED are unique when compared with values stored by STORE CLOCK and extended with zeros.--