From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Handling variable page sizes? Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 23:05:10 GMTrobertwessel2@yahoo.com (Robert Wessel) writes:
I did find a reference to an MVS APAR/PTF 0267587 having to do with running MVS Guest under VM dated 1983. The problem is that the common segment bit is only applicable when MVS is running directly on the bare hardware. When MVS is running as a VM guest ... STO-associativity has to be honored for all TLB entries (since the single MVS's guests actual segment tables aren't likely to be the only ones that exist in the system).
here is the zap.
//nnnnnn JOB (6007,X003),nnnnnn,MSGLEVEL=1,MSGCLASS=O,CLASS=B, // REGION=1024K,NOTIFY=nnnnn //ZAP EXEC PGM=AMASPZAP //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT= //SYSLIB DD DSN=SYS1.NUCLEUS,DISP=SHR FOR VM MVS GUEST, STBVR, TURN OFF USE OF COMMON SEGMENTS NAME IEAVNPX1 IEAVNPX1 VER 0DA2 96026003 OI SGTCB=1 REP 0DA2 47000000 NOP VER 0DCE 96026003 OI SGTCB=1 REP 0DCE 47000000 NOP //--
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Do any architectures use instruction count instead of timer interrupts for context changes? Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 23:14:39 GMTpeter@abbnm.com (Peter da Silva) writes:
charlie had done a lot of work on fine grain locking for smp operation and invented the compare&swap instruction as part of that work. CAS was chosen as the mnemonic because they are charlie's initials ... then had to come up with the compare&swap part to match his initials.
the guys that owned 370 architecture wouldn't put it into the architecture purely on the basis of smp (typically kernel) support ... they said that we had to come up with other uses to justify putting the instruction into 370. the result was the thread-safe operations that were originally part of the programming notes for the compare&swap instruction in the 370 POP ... and since been moved to the appendix.
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Handling variable page sizes? Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 23:32:12 GMT"glen herrmannsfeldt" writes:
IPTE purge page table entry ISTE purge segment table entry ISTO purge segment table origin PTLB purge table look aside
IPTE & ISTE turned on the respective "invalid" bits in the table entry as well as purge associative entries in the TLB.
370/155 & 370/165 processors were already in the field and needed hardware retrofit to add support for virtual memory. 165 engineers claimed that to put in any of the TLB selective invalidates would delay the introduction of 370 virtual memory by an additional six months (they would need an additional six months just to come up all the design and implementation for selective invalidate). VS2 claimed that they would never invalidate more than five pages per second and that would be done in a batch operation ... so that TLB invalidates wouldn't happen more than once a second and PTLB might be slightly more efficient. The result was that the selective invalidate instructions were dropped from the original introduction of virtual memory for 370. This was all 30+ years ago.
IPTE selective invalidate was later introduced with 3033s ... in part because the paging rate had significantly increased by that time and in part because of some smp synchronization issues (i.e. invalidating all TLBs in a shared complex).
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The problem with installable operating systems. Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 00:10:47 GMT"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" writes:
I remember first doing assemblies with PCP on 360/30 ... i believe os/360 release 6 in the 1966 time frame (I had a student summer job for the university to design and implement a 360 monitor that supported all the 1401 MPIO ur<->tape function for front end to 709). I don't remember the date for PCP (other than release 6 had to have been some time in '66). I got to design & implement my own monitor, interrupt handlers, device drivers, asynchronous task handler, buffer pool manager, etc.
after that i had a student job that included all responsibility for the OS/360 operating systems at the university. I did the sysgens, maintained the systems, etc. My first sysgen was a fairly straight forward OS/360 release 9.5 MFT. I installed HASP on it and eventually WATFOR, PLI, misc. other stuff. I started playing with re-arranging all the system files and members within PDS to optimize thruput as well as being able to do sysgens as part of standard production job stream. I gave a couple presentations on this at SHARE and some kind IBM'er in POK got me a bootlegged copy of a PDS member activity trace. I could get a trace of all accesses to PDS members and sort it by frequency and activity.
I expanded on this for my first OS/360 release 11 MFT sysgen ... I did stage1 in the production workload and got the output of stage2 ... I then created job cards for all the stage2 execution steps and re-arranged the job sequence so that datasets would be allocated in optimal seek distance order. I then went thru the move/copy member steps and re-arranged all the move/copy statements to optimally order PDS members within SYS1.LINKLIB, SYS1.SVCLIB, and some others. I gave some presentations on this at SHARE.
Around the time I was starting on OS/360 release 14 MFT sysgen at the univeristy, the CSC team showed up and installed CP/67 .... so now in addition to getting to rewrite and re-org MFT and HASP ... I had opportunity to do similar stuff for CP/67 and CMS.
My official student job was keeping the production os/360 systems fully operational and fully tuned up. The CP/67 was just some toy play stuff that I got to do on the side.
The following is an extract from a combined MFT14 and CP/67
presentation that I gave at fall '68 share meeting in Atlantic City.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#18 CP/67 & OS MFT14
most of the data in the referenced presentation is about MFT14 under CP/67 .... and a lot of pathlength rewrite that I had done to the CP/67 kernel. However, part of it also mentions that the "optimized" MFT14 running stand-alone had thruput about 3 times that of an MFT14 done using the standard sysgen process (for the univeristy workload). Furthermore, standard PTF & bug fix activity over a six month period could possibly cut production thruput in half on standard (non-CP/67) workload environment. PTFs tended to replace PDS members and mess up the carefully tuned seek ordering. Sometimes it was necessary to rebuild a system from scratch to regain the necessary member ordering for optimal seek distance
My next sysgen was an OS/360 release 15/16 MVT system. I also put 2741 and tty terminal support into HASP and a context editor that implemented the CMS editor syntax (for an early CRJE system). I had also redone the CP/67 terminal support and put TTY/ASCII support into it. It was still possible to generate PCP option up thru this period, it just that I never did.
As a student, I spent most of my time supporting and working on production OS/360 systems. I don't remember hearing about OS/360 fast-ipl until after head it from some people that had been dealing with CP/67. It doesn't mean that it didn't happen ... but I don't remember hearing about it either from IBM or at Share prior to the CP/67 connection.
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Handling variable page sizes? Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 12:02:21 GMTnmm1@cus.cam.ac.uk (Nick Maclaren) writes:
page out had some similarity to log-structured ... it used a moving cursor and allocated to the closest available track. big-track area was frequently ten times larger than expected allocated tracks (and spread across multiple drives) ... and the garbage collection of typical log-structured filesystem was eliminated since a track was de-allocated as soon as it was read.
note all of this would further increase "impressive" paging rates since sometimes there would be additional pages transferred in the 10-page set that wouldn't have been transferred if doing single page operations, basically transfer bandwidth was traded off against disk access latency, and there was always write on replace ... since there was no "home" slot that could be re-used for non-changed replaced page.
past vm/mvs big page stuff done in the '80s
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#60 Defrag in linux? - Newbie question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002b.html#20 index searching
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#29 Page size (was: VAX, M68K complex instructions)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#48 Swapper was Re: History of Login Names
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#8 What are some impressive page rates?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#11 What are some impressive page rates?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#20 Blade architectures
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#36 Do any architectures use instruction count instead of timer
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Dumb Question - Hardend Site ? Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 03:57:20 GMTefinnell@SEEBECK.UA.EDU (Edward J. Finnell, III , Ed) writes:
also for operations doing transactions with the outside ... tends to include things like diverse routing (lot of high availability stuff). there is a joke about a hardened transaction site in europe that had all the latest stuff ... except all telco came in thru a single set of overhead lines ... lightning hit a nearby tree, tree fell over and took out the telco lines ... site was out as much as if the lightning had hit the computer itself. A "real" hardened site would have had at least two sets of underground fiber entering the building from opposite sides and connecting to totally different central exchanges (this is for the backhoe scenario taking out all communication); some will have underground telco and utilities coming in from four different directions, each connecting to different central exchanges and power substations.
telco central exchange buildings tend to have quite a bit of this stuff (there was also something recently about AT&T selling off some number of bunkered location/facilities).
and then when it still isn't sufficient you replicate somewhere totally different for continuous availability (geographic survivability & disaster survivability were terms we coined when we coined when we were doing ha/cmp) ... aka not only may a site be hardened but the service may be further "hardened" with geographic replication.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Dumb Question - Hardend Site ? Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 11:46:52 GMTwerner.kuehnel@MANNHEIMER.DE (Werner Kuehnel) writes:
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Handling variable page sizes? Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 17:05:33 GMTAnne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Backdoor in AES ? Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2002 01:55:04 GMT"Roger Schlafly" writes:
c string handling libraries did much to invent most buffer overflows
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: DOS history question Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2002 18:38:18 GMTtshoppa@wmata.com (Tim Shoppa) writes:
in the mid-70s a number of the smaller, outlying operations were being consolidated.
in '76, vm/370 development in burlington mall was being closed and the group consolidated in endicott. at some point the head of POK realized that MVS/XA development was dependent on the VMTOOL (a internal only version of VM for providing XA virtual machines in support of operating system development) and the people got told that instead of moving to Endicott as part of product development they had to move to POK to support the internal VMTOOL (and another round of VM product being killed). Some number refused to moved to POK and instead left IBM to go to work for DEC on VMS.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Backdoor in AES ? Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2002 19:01:03 GMTAnne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: DOS history question Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 18:21:13 GMTBrian Inglis writes:
In cms, "wait" was an internal kernel routine that assumed it was called by program with all hex zeros as deliminating the parameter list. It was possible to call it from exec processor by careful editing and inserting hex zeros. The following file had a name of "waitload exec". The command line processor actually fed into the same command resolution as internal kernel calls or other command calls (aka in cms it was actually possible to create files with name of internal kernel routines and have the alias executed in place of the real kernel routine). This capability was somewhat inhibited in the time-frame of CMS for VM/370 (aka early '70s) where a new "fast" kernel call procedure was implemented (it was expensive to force every routine linkage thru the same lookup interface as was used for commad entry from a terminal). It was still possible to do the hack to access internal routines from command line ... but internal code linkages started using a fast lookup bypass.
waitload exec:
&CONTROL OFF
CP SP C CL Y
-READ DISK LOAD
&IF &RETCODE EQ 0 &SKIP 1
WAIT RDR1RDR1 ........
-DSKLOAD DISK LOAD
CP SP C CL A
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: End of Moore's law and how it can influence job market ..... Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 23:26:25 GMTbjl@cs.purdue.edu (Bradley J Lucier) writes:
slightly related from totally different thread
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#70
referring to various legislation (mostly during the 80s) that promoted being able to commercialize gov. funded stuff.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Do any architectures use instruction count instead of timer interruptsfor context changes? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 18:17:20 GMTjmfbahciv writes:
slightly related boyd comment
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#16 mainframe question
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: fingerprint authentication Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 18:45:29 GMT"Anton Stiglic" writes:
an issue is that biometric readings in general tned to be quite fuzzy (in fact an exact 100 percent reproduction could be indication of an attack). most systems have various complex things having to do with matching thresholds ... degree of match below the threshold are rejected, while those above the match are accepted. this leads to all the stuff about false negatives (valid biometric that are rejected) and false positives (invalid biometric that are accepted).
transmitting the minutia to server-based infrastructure leads to lots of issues. x9.84 devotes lots of time to server-based infrastructure, not only the storage of the server registration ... but also the transmission of the minutia readins as well as the whole end-to-end infrastructure. smartcards have the advantage that attacks from stealing a smartcard is extremely localized ... i.e. first a specific smartcard is stolen and then attacked. compromise of a server-based infrastructure can lead to exposure of hundreds of thousands of minutia.
this is analogous to the whole shared-secret vis-a-vis secret
discussion. a registered template in server-based infrastructure is a
shared-secret based operation ... with the additional disadvantage
that it is a little more difficult to re-issue hundreds of thousands
of fingerprints (as composed to re-issuing hundres of thousands of
pins or account numbers). another comparison is the compromises of
payment card databases at merchants ... aka security proportional
to risk:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#61 Security Proportional To Risk
also related to security proportional to risk, x9.84, biometrics in
transactions/operations involving value and server-based infrastructure is the
issue of threshold levels related to transaction value (possibly
higher threshold levels for higher transaction values). majority of
current cardbased infrastructures have difficulty with adjusting
threshold level to transactions .... except of the aads chip strawman
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#aads
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: What is microcode? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 22:45:58 GMTSam Yorko writes:
what was worse ... the backup tapes had been moved to a different room.
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: A new e-commerce security proposal Newsgroups: alt.computer.security Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 02:54:46 GMTzgene writes:
what does amazon.com gets out of a userid & password? or a certificate?
merchants typically want to know that they are going to get money. register all the items you want that have nothing at all to do with financial related purposes. it doesn't contribute a whole lot to getting money to the merchant.
so maybe amazon.com ... as part of making the experience simpler for a user ... pre-registers some amount of information ... especially information related to amazon.com getting paid; they then place a unique tag on that information ... a tag that is convinient for the end user to reproduce but is also is reproduce securely. so that information is tagged with some form of "id" ... that could be a certificate id, a user id, a information id, a tag id ... any id. then it is necessary to authenticate that an entity claiming that id is really the same entity that registered that id.
So one way is a cookie ... the id goes into the cookie ... a shared-secret (aka password, pin, key, etc, that happens to be registerd at the same time as the original information) goes along with the ID. any person claiming that id ... has to also reproduce the shared-secret (aka password, pin, key, etc).
So another way is a public key. A certificate with no information doesn't authenticate anything. There has to be some tie between the certificate and the information that got registerd at amazon.com. So lets say that at the same time the original information is registerd ... the certificate is registerd. The entity wanted to establish the id at amazon.com that they had previously registerd ... sends something that claims that they own that id ... and sends along a digital signature to authenticate that they are the originators of that entry. However, it isn't actually necessary to have a certificate at all to perform this mechanism. When the entry with all the information is originally created ... a public key (all by itself) is included in that information ... and the creation transaction is digital signed (prooving the entity posseses the corresponding private key to the public key supplied).
So in this case ... it is possible to substitute a public key as
authentication material in place of password, pin, or some other
key. Any certificate is redundant and superfluous. example of this in
more detail:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#aads
example of being able to use this method with respect to financial
transactions .... passing digital signature on the financial
transaction and not really needing certificates:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#x959
some discussion of not needing certificates for SSL, server-based
authentication:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#sslcerts
other forms of using public keys in business processes that currently
are userid/password based:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#radius
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: A new e-commerce security proposal Newsgroups: alt.computer.security Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 19:00:44 GMTzgene writes:
lets hypothesis that once a merchant ... or anybody else ... ran across such information ... would they cache it someplace for future reference (aka customer profiles stuff)? the only way that I know where that might be successful is if it was totally impossible for the merchant/others to actually read the information. if it was totally impossible for a merchant to access such information (say encryption) ... one then claims that it is superfluous to actually send it to the merchant (this is the trivial example showing that relying-party-only certificates ... aka account number and public key ... are redundant and superfluous).
one of the critiera given the x9a10 working group for the x9.59 standard was to preserved the integrity of the financial infrastructure (including consumer/client privacy) for all retail payments (credit, debit, stored-value), etc) in all environments (internet, non-internet, point-of-sale, etc).
x9.59 refs:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#x959
misc. past privacy postings
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#privacy
misc. past fraud postings
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#fraud
EU actually put out a directive that electronic payments should be as anonymous as cash. having even a little bit of the information you suggest in a certificate represents a horrendous privacy violation.
misc. postings regarding relying-party-only certificates (financial
institutions attempting to address the horrendous privacy problems of
even simple x.509 identity certificates):
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#pressign President Clinton digital signing
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#client4 Client-side revocation checking capabilityh
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#techno digital signatures, technology experiments, and service operations
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech6 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#kiss1 KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE: ASN.1 vs XML (used to be RE: I-D ACTION :draft-ietf-pkix-scvp- 00.txt))
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#kiss4 KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE: ASN.1 vs XML (used to be RE: I-D ACTION :draft-ietf-pkix-scvp- 00.txt))
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#kiss5 Common misconceptions, was Re: KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE: ASN.1 vs XML (used to be RE: I-D ACTION :draft-ietf-pkix-scvp- 00.txt))
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm4.htm#9 Thin PKI won - You lost
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#x959 X9.59 Electronic Payment Standard
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#shock revised Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#liex509 Lie in X.BlaBla...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#pkimort PKI: Evolve or Die
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#spki Simple PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#spki2 Simple PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#spki4 Simple PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm7.htm#rhose10 when a fraud is a sale, Re: Rubber hose attack
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm7.htm#rhose11 when a fraud is a sale, Re: Rubber hose attack
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki8 Software for PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki11 Software for PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm9.htm#softpki23 Software for PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm9.htm#cfppki CFP: PKI research workshop
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#18 IBM alternative to PKI?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#19 IBM alternative to PKI?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#21 IBM alternative to PKI?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#40 ALARMED ... Only Mostly Dead ... RIP PKI ... part II
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#22 draft-ietf-pkix-warranty-ext-01
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ansiepay.htm#aadsnwi2 updates for (AADS) Relying-Party Certification Business Practices
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#votec (my) long winded observations regarding X9.59 & XML, encryption and certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#openclose open CADS and closed AADS
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#dsdebate Digital Signatures Spark Debate
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#228 Attacks on a PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#36 "Trusted" CA - Oxymoron?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#40 "Trusted" CA - Oxymoron?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#41 "Trusted" CA - Oxymoron?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#40 general questions on SSL certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#41 Why trust root CAs ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#15 Why trust root CAs ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#56 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#58 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#72 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#79 Q: ANSI X9.68 certificate format standard
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#7 Invalid certificate on 'security' site.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#35 Can I create my own SSL key?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#77 FREE X.509 Certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#65 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#68 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#0 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#3 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#16 Net banking, is it safe???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#39 PKI Implementation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#56 PKI and Relying Parties
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#72 Digital certificate varification
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Do any architectures use instruction count instead of timer interruptsfor context changes? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2002 18:18:36 GMTjmfbahciv writes:
i think that the claim was that management appropriately applied could increase the productivity of the whole group by a factor of 5-10 aka over & above what productity already was; and directly attributable to positive management action ... and not compared to possible absolutely worst management action.
corollary was some line about the worst possible manager is somebody who believe they know what they are doing.
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - ** From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: A new e-commerce security proposal Newsgroups: alt.computer.security Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2002 19:06:03 GMTzgene writes:
from identity information, merchant doesn't even know what the bank account payment is or even if there is sufficient funds in any bank account.
Also, the EU privacy guideline is even saying that the name on the front (or in magstripe) of existing payment cards is a privacy violation ... addresses even further aggravate that (address may be a requirement for shipping goods but needs to be removed as requirement for payment ... and there are now even anonymizers for physical good shipment).
Identity is not suppose to be part of payment transaction at retail point of sale (online or physical) .... not a lot of identity, not a little bit of identity, just plain identity.
Part of the reason for eliminating (all) identity at point of sale is privacy. The other part .... using reference of current day ISO8583 online transactions ... doesn't need identity to guarantee payment to the merchant. The problem is actually even worse ... for the majority of simple retail transactions ... if a merchant ever has to resort to actually referring to name/address for payment ... they are loosing money.
some about the current mechanism
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn1
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn2
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn3
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn4
is derived from MOTO (mail-order, telephone-order) that does an online transaction and uses name/mail-address as corroborating authentication information as part of the online transaction (AVS auth trans).
issue is that the information is effectively shared-secret and can be
harvested and reproduced. the original MOTO assumed small additional
protection that there would always be a hardgood shipment to the
address of record verified in the online transaction. misc. harvesting
refs:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#fraud
furthermore much of the information has to be kept around and available at the merchant for subsequent business processes related to the transaction (i.e. you just can't throw it away).
X9.59 mapped to ISO8583 basically tacks a digital signature onto an existing auth trans (debit, credit, stored-value, etc, and in hardware token can be done at online as well as point-of-sale) ... it preserves all the real-time advantage to the merchant that they really know that they have high probability of getting paid ... and eliminates some of the weakenesses of the existing shared-secrets for authentication (even ability to harvest just the account number and use it for fraudulent transaction).
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: A new e-commerce security proposal Newsgroups: alt.computer.security Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2002 22:47:34 GMTzgene writes:
let's look at the idea of only needing to execute a commerce transaction that contains just the above information ... the merchant/relying-party gets the above ... validates that it is a good certificate but (as per prior ref) doesn't keep or retain the information.
applying a little KISS and transposing to the physical world ... I get a gov. credential with my name, mailing address and e-mail address (lets just say that it is called a drivers license). With this credential, I can go into any store in the world, totally fill my shopping cart, walk up to the check out counter and present my credential. The clerk confirms my credential as being valid ... but doesn't record any information from the credential. Furthermore, I don't need to present any money or payment card ... or any other means of payment; once the clerk validates that I have a valid drivers license or other gov. credential ... I'm allowed to walk out with all the goods w/o ever being required to pay for them.
previous posts in thread:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#16 A new e-commerce security proposal
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#17 A new e-commerce security proposal
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#19 A new e-commerce security proposal
random past e-commerce related threads:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#killer0 Killer PKI Applications
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#killer1 Killer PKI Applications
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#setjava javasoft SET - NO!
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#storage Storage of Certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#integrity Scale (and the SRV record)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech2 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech3 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#ecomm Authentication in eCommerce applications
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#imicro Authentication in eCommerce applications
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn1 Assurance, e-commerce, and some x9.59 ... fyi
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn2 Assurance, e-commerce, and some x9.59 ... fyi
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn3 Assurance, e-commerce, and some x9.59 ... fyi
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#epaym "e-payments" email discussion list is now "Internet-payments"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#shock revised Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm6.htm#ppsem3 Payment Processing Seminars
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm6.htm#terror5 [FYI] Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm6.htm#terror7 [FYI] Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm6.htm#terror9 [FYI] Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists? (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm7.htm#pcards4 FW: The end of P-Cards?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm7.htm#cryptofree Erst-Freedom: Sic Semper Political Cryptography
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm7.htm#rubberhose Rubber hose attack
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm7.htm#3dsecure 3D Secure Vulnerabilities?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#rhose17 [Fwd: Re: when a fraud is a sale, Re: Rubber hose attack]
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki11 Software for PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm9.htm#carnivore Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm9.htm#cfppki5 CFP: PKI research workshop
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm9.htm#cfppki10 CFP: PKI research workshop
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#cfppki13 CFP: PKI research workshop
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#tamper Limitations of limitations on RE/tampering (was: Re: biometrics)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#bio3 biometrics (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#bio7 biometrics
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#boyd AN AGILITY-BASED OODA MODEL FOR THE e-COMMERCE/e-BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#limit2 Q: Where should do I put a max amount in a X.509v3 certificate?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#1 Basic credit-card payment question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#16 international financial standards (ISO TC68)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#17 Alternative to Microsoft Passport: Sunshine vs Hai
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#30 Proposal: A replacement for 3D Secure
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#43 PKI: Only Mostly Dead
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#3 [3d-secure] NEWS: 3D-Secure and Passport
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#8 [3d-secure] 3D Secure and EMV
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#14 Challenge to TCPA/Palladium detractors
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#18 Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#24 Interests of online banks and their users [was Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM]
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ansiepay.htm#aadsach NACHA to Test ATM Card Payments for Consumer Internet Purchases
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ansiepay.htm#x959bai X9.59/AADS announcement at BAI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ansiepay.htm#scaads X9.59 related press release at smartcard forum
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay2.htm#otp X9.59 email purchase transactions (from lynn)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay2.htm#fed Federal CP model and financial transactions
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#riskm The Thread Between Risk Management and Information Security
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#riskaads AADS & RIsk Management, and Information Security Risk Management (ISRM)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#smrtcrd Smart Cards with Chips encouraged ... fyi
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay4.htm#comcert Merchant Comfort Certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay4.htm#miscdns misc. other DNS
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#fraud Online Card Fraud Thirty Times That Offline
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#idf Intel Developer's Forum ... fyi
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#harvest harvesting of credit card numbers
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#ecomich call for new measures: ICH would be glad to help
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay7.htm#netbank net banking, is it safe?? ... power to the consumer
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay7.htm#netsecure some recent threads on netbanking & e-commerce security
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay8.htm#ccfraud Almost Half UK E-Shopper's Fear Card Fraud (CC fraud increased by 50% in 2k)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay8.htm#visapass VISA: All Your Password Are Belong to Us
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay8.htm#x959paper Credit Card Fraud and E-Commerce: A Case Study
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#7 UNCITRAL Electronic Contracting Project
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#8 FSTC to Validate WAP 1.2.1 Specification for Mobile Commerce
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#20 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#22 PKI: An Insider's View
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#42 FSTC Announces Proximity Payment Trial
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#5 x9.59 electronic payment standard
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#41 AADS, X9.59, & privacy
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#48 X9.59 & AADS
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#16 Old Computers
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#79 Authentication in eCommerce applications
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#80 Authentication in eCommerce applications
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#217 AADS/X9.59 demo & standards at BAI (world-wide retail banking) show
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#224 X9.59/AADS announcement at BAI this week
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#235 Attacks on a PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#36 "Trusted" CA - Oxymoron?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#5 e-commerce: Storing Credit Card numbers safely
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#48 Use of SET?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#50 Egghead cracked, MS IIS again
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#54 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#41 solicit advice on purchase of digital certificate
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#26 Can I create my own SSL key?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#31 Remove the name from credit cards!
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#11 FREE X.509 Certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#25 Root certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#7 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#51 future of e-commerce
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#58 Net banking, is it safe???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#64 Net banking, is it safe???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#52 misc loosely-coupled, sysplex, cluster, supercomputer, & electronic commerce
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#56 E-commerce security????
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#57 E-commerce security????
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#0 E-commerce security????
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#2 E-commerce security????
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#5 E-commerce security????
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#9 E-commerce security????
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#23 OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#52 Are client certificates really secure?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#34 A thought on passwords
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#55 I-net banking security
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#10 E-commerce security????
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#25 ESCON Data Transfer Rate
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#32 Buffer overflow
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#31 You think? TOM
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#35 TOPS-10 logins (Was Re: HP-2000F - want to know more about it)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#36 economic trade off in a pure reader system
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#8 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#35 PKI Implementation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#41 Why?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#18 Opinion on smartcard security requested
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#36 Crypting with Fingerprints ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#40 Smart Cards
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#73 Blade architectures
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#10 Least folklorish period in computing (was Re: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#23 Computers in Science Fiction
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#27 Security Issues of using Internet Banking
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#28 Security Issues of using Internet Banking
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#31 Security and e-commerce
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#33 Security and e-commerce
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#34 Security and e-commerce
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#35 Security and e-commerce
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#40 e-commerce future
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#45 Biometric Encryption: the solution for network intruders?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#83 Questions about computer security
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#6 Biometric authentication for intranet websites?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#31 Computers in Science Fiction
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#41 Biometric authentication for intranet websites?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#68 Are you really who you say you are?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#18 Symmetric-Key Credit Card Protocol on Web Site
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#63 SSL integrity guarantees in abscense of client certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#44 how to build tamper-proof unix server?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#5 What good is RSA when using passwords ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#11 IEEE article on intelligence and security
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#24 Two questions on HMACs and hashing
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#35 Cryptography
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Original K & R C Compilers. Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 19:34:43 GMT"Douglas H. Quebbeman" writes:
there was a version of unix ported to a stripped down tss/370 kernel
that was used only inside at&t (it had a code name but it slips my
mind at the moment). random past refs:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#4a John Hartmann's Birthday Party
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#64 distributed locking patents
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#92 Ux's good points.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#61 VM (not VMS or Virtual Machine, the IBM sort)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#8 IBM Linux
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#68 TSS ancient history, was X86 ultimate CISC? designs)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#70 TSS ancient history, was X86 ultimate CISC? designs)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#77 Pentium 4 Prefetch engine?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#19 SIMTICS
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#20 VM-CMS emulator
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#22 Early AIX including AIX/370
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#23 MERT Operating System & Microkernels
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#8 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#17 mainframe question
a former co-worker did some extensive work with the compiler in the
early to mid 80s at a chip-shop porting a number of bezerkely chip
tools to vm/cms. he said that there was a large number of bugs that he
had to fix and also significantly rewrite the code-generation
optimizer. he was also the original beta-test for the c-compiler that
ibm chose to OEM for 370 ... which he also had to do significant
debugging on. past ref
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#18 mainframe question
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: DOS history question Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 23:56:53 GMTEric Sosman writes:
in the late '80s was platform for the applications for one of their
large customers. following newsgroup posting is totally unrelated
that my wife and i were doing in the late '80s.
From: alexv@Atex.Kodak.COM (Alex Volanis)
Newsgroups: comp.newprod
Date: 1 Jul 92 19:27:54 GMT
NEW PRODUCT ANNOUNCEMENT: Ultra High Performace Fault Tolerant File
Server
Atex Inc., a Kodak subsidiary, a supplier of high availability
publishing systems has developed a Ultra high performance fault
tolerant NFS file server. The product allows NFS client processes to
continue computing, in the event of any single point of failure of the
server or its network enviroment, even if the failure occurred
mid-transaction. This is accomplished without any modification to
client software.
The fault tolerant system is comprised of two 486 servers, one acting
as a primary server and the other as a secondary server. Each server
runs Unix V.3. A proprietary high speed interface connects the two
servers. The dual servers eliminate all single points of failure.
Continuous diagnostic monitoring of all system interfaces, including
the required un-interuptable powersupply, enables the secondary server
to detect when to take over client processes from a failed primary
server.
A change journal of all data blocks modified since the primary server
went down is used to quickly bring the primary back into data
synchronization when it is returned to service.
A modified UNIX file system copies all file system data updates from
the primary server to the secondary server. The dual data copies
obviate the need to commit file system data to disk. The use of a
large buffer cache allows the file server to operate out of memory
with little or no disk reads or writes. The result is large
improvement in UNIX file system and data base performance. The
secondary server can be used in a read only mode for further
performance gains.
Atex is looking for a strategic partner to market the FTFS product and
will port the product to the operating system and hardware of the
selected vendor.
For further product information contact:
Gordon Vinther
Atex Inc.
805 Middlesex Tpk.
Billerica Ma., 01821
U.S.A.
Tel: (508)670-3133
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: DOS history question Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2002 00:04:54 GMTmisc. other atex ...
Subject: "Can Atex Keep Its Proprietary Place in the Newsroom?"
Source: NY Times, 3/17/91, pg F4, John Markoff <120 LINES>
'A favorite is being superseded by desktop software'
o Atex Inc., Billerica MA
- once the world's premier maker of editorial and advertising systems
- now under pressure as new technology and nimble competitors challenge
o Bill Solimeno, Seybold Publishing Group (Media PA) analyst
"They don't have a competitive product today and they need one quickly"
o the news lately has been unrelentingly bad
- 3 multi-million deals have gone to their chief competitor, S11 from
Systems Integrators, Sacramento CA
. Toronto Star
. Washington Post
. Westchester Rockland Newspapers
- 2 weeks ago Atex announced the latest in their layoffs
. they are now down to 600 employees, from 1985's 1,400
- Time Magazine dropped their hardware service and support contract
. Time was Atex's premier magazine customer
- then Time announced plans at the Seybold seminar in Boston last month
. they're going to create a division and compete with Atex
. using Macintosh software technology from P.Ink (Germany)
o Atex was founded in 1973 by Charles and Richard Ying
- they developed their first system in an unheated loft in Lexington MA
after graduating from MIT
- Ray Toothaker, Advanced Technology Solutions pres. & former Atex exec
"They would be a classic business school study case.
The thing that's sad is they had the market and they let it go.
It was a revolutionary business when it started.
But Kodak slowed us down during a crucial period beginning in 1981.
They brought in two chemists who knew nothing about high technology"
- Kodak bought Atex from its founders for $77M
Atex announced a new president in January, and a new strategy
o they were developing a "big bang" product with IBM
- instead they will go to a modular approach
- they hope for more than a dozen products before yearend
o Brian Lacey, Atex president and former Monotype (UK) head
"This company has been in a deep freeze.
We have to come out and show the what this technology can do"
o industry executives say Atex lost it's grip because:
- they were slow to modernize, and
- slow to recognize the power of the PC desktop publishing wave
. Atex's business was based on a minicomputer system from DEC
. minicomputer sales have largely sagged in the face of PC systems
o the same features that were exclusive to Atex are available on desktops
- plus features that newspaper publishers have been looking for
o Atex may be too late to save it's still-considerable customer base
- Paul Brainerd, Aldus (Seattle WA) president
"It's a fundamental change in the business model.
It's very difficult for a company to make this kind of transition
when everything is changing in the way you do business"
. he founded Aldus when he left Atex in 1984
o Lacey took over with a mandate from Kodak and IBM
- do whatever it takes to get back on track
o Atex will adopt to industry hardware and software standards: Lacey
- they'll also open their product line and work with other companies
- industry officials are adopting a wait and see:
. can Atex make progress while cutting headcount?
o Atex is going to finish new technology projects for newsroom pagination
- combining digitized photos and text on a computer screen and
sending the result directly to the printing press
- the New York Times announced a $22M plan in 1988
. Atex and IBM would develop a customized system
- there have been delays with the system, still...
. installation of the text editing will take place this year
. without the page layout feature
o Jonathon Seybold, Seybold Report publisher
"What you have is a company that has retreated into a corner.
It's partly ATex's fault and partly its customers fault"
- large newspapers had become too dependent on Atex
'the thought of changing systems is too painful to consider'
o Lacey believes Atex will stave off the desktop onslaught
"It's very easy for passion to be forgotten when you're part of a large
multinational company. We have to bring passion back to what we do"
Accompanied by a box, "Catching the '4th Wave'"
o a lot of the talk at the Seybold seminar in Boston was about Time & P.Ink
- selling sophisticated editorial production software to magazines & papers
o P.Ink Software Engineering is a modular collection of software programs
- they combine other commercial software...
. Quark's Xpress page-layout program
. a range of database managers, text editors, newswire viewers
o the programs run on Apple Macintoshes
- "IBMs RS/6000", Next's Nextstation and other Unix systems to be added
o P.Ink allows a reporter or editor to write in one window...
- while watching newswires in another...
- and simultaneously running other Mac programs
- it's the holy grail of publishing:
. combining editing, pagination, and coordinating with dozens of
other writers and editors
o Gerald Lelivre, Time director of development for pre-press systems
"I felt the software had potential, however they were a small German
company that had no immediate intention of moving into the US.
I couldn't afford to wait"
- P.Ink is installed at 10 sites in Germany
- at Leipziger Volkszeitung, P.Ink controls a system of 140 reporters
and editors using Macintosh Ilc's
Accompanied by a chart, "Atex's Stake Amoung Leading Newspapers"
Newspaper Circulation System
Wall Street Journal 1,835,713 Information Int'l
USA Today 1,325,507 Atex
Daily News 1,194,237 Atex
Los Angeles Times 1,107,823 Systems Integrators
New York Times 1,068,217 Atex, Harris
Washington Post 772,749 Systems Integrators
Chicago Tribune 720,155 Hazeltine
Newsday 700,174 Atex
Detroit News 690,422 Systems Integrators
Detroit Free Press 626,434 Atex
San Francisco Chronicle 560,640 Systems Integrators
Chicago Sun-Times 535,884 Atex
Boston Globe 516,031 Atex
New York Post 507,568 Harris
Philadelphia Inquirer 504,903 Atex
--
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Original K & R C Compilers. Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2002 00:32:06 GMTattached some random bit of information. note that the sss/370 (tss/370 kernel work to support running unix on top) for at&t had started in 1979.
while the compiler ran on cms ... it & runtime libraries were
written using os-simulation (i.e. os/360 kernel api interfaces that
were simulated by cms). the chip-shop work mentioned in previous
reference
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#21 original K & R C Compilers
in 1984, also undertook to rewrite the internals to use native CMS APIs
Date: 2 Nov 1983 20:46:32-EST (Wednesday)
To: C370_fans
Subject: C compiler for 370.
In reply to your question about C/370 licenses.
Source license is $2000. The contact at ATT for source licenses is:
Max Wicker (919) 697-6760
ATT Technology Licensing
PO Box 25000
Greensboro, NC 27420
Binary licenses are $200 (one-time charge). However, ATT does not sell
any binary licenses directly.
You also understand that a C/370 license is independent of any other ATT
software license (e. g. a C/370 license does not imply any rights
with respect to UNIX software, nor does a UNIX license imply
any rights with respect to C/370 software).
Also include a statement of the steps that you will take to protect the
software from users who may not be aware of the above requirements,
such as use of read passwords, etc.
Please let me know if you find/fix any bugs (no flames, please).
For example, the pre-processor reports line numbers in source files
incorrectly, so it is necessary to look at the output of the C
Pre-Processor and do some arithmetic to find the errors reported by the
compiler. There are also problems in the libraries. For example, fseek()
does not seem to work, even in the limited way that is advertized.
There are differences in the ascii-to-ebcdic conversions used by
C/370 from the "standard" IBM translations (I will include VM2CC EXEC
which may help with this if you are trying to import C code).
I have also written routine to use the new PLIST form of command-line
arguments, mixed-case untokenized by CMS. See C_CMDS SCRIPT for info
and C370PRO C for how to install it.
Editing invisible characters on a 3277 is aided by macros FROMCC XEDIT
and TOCC XEDIT (TELLCC XEDIT documents how to type these characters).
______
UNIX is a trademark of Bell Laboratories.
... snip ... top of post, old email index
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Original K & R C Compilers. Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2002 03:05:33 GMTAnne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Original K & R C Compilers. Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2002 03:55:25 GMTalso from some place ...
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Root certificate definition Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2002 20:03:06 GMT"Johan Stäck" writes:
there has been a number of threads recently that the complexity
(non-KISS) of the PKI infrastructure (certfication authorities,
certification processes, intepretation of certificate options, etc),
is in itself a major vulnerability ... leading to exploits (analogous to
the significant number of exploits and vulnerabilities associated with
the semantics of the c-language string and buffer handling interfaces)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#fraud
from:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/secure.htm
root
(I) A CA that is directly trusted by an end entity. Acquiring the
value of a root CA's public key involves an out-of-band procedure. (I)
Hierarchical PKI usage: The CA that is the highest level (most
trusted) CA in a certification hierarchy; i.e., the authority upon
whose public key all certificate users base their trust. (C) In a
hierarchical PKI, a root issues public-key certificates to one or more
additional CAs that form the second highest level. Each of these CAs
may issue certificates to more CAs at the third highest level, and so
on. To initialize operation of a hierarchical PKI, the root's initial
public key is securely distributed to all certificate users in a way
that does not depend on the PKI's certification relationships. The
root's public key may be distributed simply as a numerical value, but
typically is distributed in a self-signed certificate in which the
root is the subject. The root's certificate is signed by the root
itself because there is no higher authority in a certification
hierarchy. The root's certificate is then the first certificate in
every certification path. (O) MISSI usage: A name previously used for
a MISSI policy creation authority, which is not a root as defined
above for general usage, but is a CA at the second level of the MISSI
hierarchy, immediately subordinate to a MISSI policy approving
authority. (O) UNIX usage: A user account (also called 'superuser')
that has all privileges (including all security-related privileges)
and thus can manage the system and its other user accounts. [RFC2828]
(see also certificate, certification, key, Multi-Level Information
System Security Initiative)
root CA
The Certification Authority that is trusted by everyone. The root CA
issues digital certificates to other CAs. [misc] (see also
certification authority, public-key infrastructure)
root certificate
(I) A certificate for which the subject is a root. (I) Hierarchical
PKI usage: The self-signed public-key certificate at the top of a
certification hierarchy. [RFC2828] (see also certification, key,
certificate) root key (I) A public key for which the matching private
key is held by a root. [RFC2828] (see also key)
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: simple architecture machine instruction set Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2002 21:44:42 GMTRoberto de Iriarte writes:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#14 S/360 addressing
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#25 MTS & LLMPS?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#35 Why IBM use 31 bit addressing not 32 bit?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#10 VM: checking some myths.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#36 History
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#43 FA: Early IBM Software and Reference Manuals
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#40 using >=4GB of memory on a 32-bit processor
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#49 Hardest Mistake in Comp Arch to Fix
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Computer Security Taxonomy Newsgroups: comp.security.unix Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2002 04:18:39 GMTNSU writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Root certificate definition Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2002 04:13:52 GMTas an aside ... note that the hierarchical PKI trust model somewhat originated in the '80s targeting an offline, electronic environment and in many ways patterned after the offline, non-electronic credit card model of the '60s.
basically the offline credit card model had credentials (plastic cards), trust hierarchy (brands & logos), and periodic credential revokation lists. the hierarchical PKI trust model of the '80s in many ways attempted to emulate this offline model but updated with electronic technology.
one issue was that the offline, non-electronic credit card model observed in the '70s that for things of value, the advent of online electronic operations made it possible to economically transition from an offline, non-electronic model to an online, electronic model (completely bypassing a possible intermediate step of offline, electronic paradigm). in many ways, the '80s hierarchical PKI trust model was an enormous step backwards except possibly for no-value operations. As a result there is sometimes something of an oxymoron relating a trust PKI hierarchy to no-value operations.
The '80s niche that the trust PKI hierarchy was attempting to address were no-value, offline email of the early '80s; aka a dialed connection was temporarily made to the entities email post office, email was exchanged, and the link was broken. The issue in processing offline email was what authentication mechanism could be used? ... since it was not possible to directly contact an authoritative reference (as happened in the transition to electronic, online operation made by the payment card industry in the '70s for valued opertions).
The alternative model that emerged for processing offline email was PGP. Rather than explicitly performing out-of-band verification of each and every trusted 3rd party root certificates ... and then implicitly relying on the trust in the 3rd parties to correctly verify all parties that you might wish to communicate with .... you explicitly used out-of-band verification for every party that you needed to have valued/trusted email.
The 3rd party trust model never really hit any big time use until SSL and HTTPS for electronic commerce. This was somewhat a transition scenario, while SSL & HTTPS were online models, there was a desire to incrementally deploy pieces of the infrastructure before online authoritative agencies were available. In fact, one of the major reasons given for the deployment of SSL & HTTPS at all was various itegrity concerns with regard to the existing online authoritative agencies for domain name to ip-address lookup (i.e. the domain name infrastructure).
Note, however that much of the SSL/HTTPS infrastructure can be considered somewhat a facade overlaying the existing domain name infrastructure because the domain name infrastructure, is in fact the authoritative reference for domain name ownership ... aka when you apply to a trusted third party certification authority for a domain name SSL server certificate, the TTP-CA has to rely on the authoritative agency responsible for domain name ownership ... the domain name infrastructure (concerns about the integrity of this very same infrastructure gave rise to having SSL/HTTPS originally).
In what might be considered an apparent catch-22, there are proposals (including some needed by the TTP CA operations) to signifcantly improve the integrity of the domain name infrastructure (in no small part so that TTP CA operations can rely on it). Note however that significant improvement in the integrity of the (online, realtime) domain name infrastucture would largely negate the justification for having SSL domain name server certificates.
random refs:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#sslcerts
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: simple architecture machine instruction set Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2002 19:34:44 GMTnmm1@cus.cam.ac.uk (Nick Maclaren) writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Computer Security Taxonomy Newsgroups: comp.security.unix Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 14:19:11 GMTNSU writes:
i also use it for the IETF RFC standards process .... as changes/additions
occur ... they are loaded and the index is regenerated ... but there is
also several consistency checks regarding change/addition are consistent
with the defined standards process for the internet
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
an idiosyncracy of the glossary/taxonomy application is that URL for specific entries being automatically generated ... when the knowledge base changes ... the generated URL for specific entries may change.
some notes regarding sources of the merged gtlossary/taxonomy
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#glosnote
while some of the taxonomy structures are gleaned from the original sources, i've tended to make significant additions.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: simple architecture machine instruction set Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 14:00:06 GMTnmm1@cus.cam.ac.uk (Nick Maclaren) writes:
the virtual memory segement registers were as accessible as general purpose registers ... and it was as easy to change a virtual memory register as it was to change a pointer/addressing register. to some extent this gave rise to statements about ROMP (pc/rt) being 40-bit addressing (inverted tables, 32-bit addresses, 4bit segment register selection, 28bit segment displacement, 12bit segment register values ... 12+28=40bits ... and then rios being 24+28=52bit addressing).
course nearly all of that started to evaporate when ROMP was retargeted to unix platfrom instead of displaywriter follow-on platform.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: good asymmetric algorithm Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 21:20:30 GMT"Frank Leggett" writes:
While blow/two fish aren't listed in the current ciphersuites the following from RFC 2246, appendix A.5, pg. 54:
Note: All cipher suites whose first byte is 0xFF are considered
private and can be used for defining local/experimental
algorithms. Interoperability of such types is a local matter.
Note: Additional cipher suites can be registered by publishing an RFC
which specifies the cipher suites, including the necessary TLS
protocol information, including message encoding, premaster secret
derivation, symmetric encryption and MAC calculation and appropriate
reference information for the algorithms involved. The RFC editor's
office may, at its discretion, choose to publish specifications for
cipher suites which are not completely described (e.g., for classified
algorithms) if it finds the specification to be of technical interest
and completely specified.
Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are
reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in SSL
3.
...=========================================================
also ...
RFC 3268
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: simple architecture machine instruction set Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 02:06:17 GMTJ Ahlstrom writes:
there are some claims that risc/801 was in part a re-action to the excessive complexity of FS project where everything and the kitchen sink was being dropped into hardware ... supposedly one of the things that killed FS was one report that claimed if a real FS machine was implemented with the fastest 370 (195) technology then available at the time ... its thruput would be that of a 370 less than 1/10th as powerful (370/145).
another past issue was existance of legacy executables tightly coupled to specific machine and lengthy conversion transition whenever hardware changed. risc happened to come into its stride in a market segment that was trying to get away from the tight coupling between executables and hardware ISA. Promoting compiler technology for hardware optimization was synergistic with promoting compiler technology for portability purposes.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: (OT) acceptance of technology, was: Convenient and secure eCommerce using POWF Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 01:31:04 GMT"Paul Pires" writes:
if the merchant is bankrupt (or skips town), then the merchant's financial institution is liable (merchant credit card banks "like" airline merchants because of the profitable charges ... but they also really hate it when they go bankrupt, they are on the hook for charges for undelivered services, which can easily be tens of millions). The consumer's issuing bank is at the end of that line behind the merchants and the merchants' finanical institutions.
Of course fraud, bankruptcy, etc is cost of doing business ... and shows up in fees and charges one way or another. Merchant has to accept discount rate on credit card charges as cost of doing business as well as fraud as cost of doing business. Lots of merchants (and banks) may buy fraud insurance ... the premiums for that insurance is also cost of doing business. In much the same way that defrauding insurance companies result in higher premiums that everybody pays ... defrauding anybody results in higher cost of doing business and is ultimately passed on to the consumer.
general fraud, exploit, vulnerabilities:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#fraud
lots of card fradu related postings:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#debitfraud Debit card fraud in Canada
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#scanon Smartcard anonymity patents
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech3 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#shock revised Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm6.htm#terror7 [FYI] Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm6.htm#terror14 [FYI] Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists? (addenda to chargebacks)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm6.htm#pcards2 The end of P-Cards? (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm7.htm#auth Who or what to authenticate?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm7.htm#auth2 Who or what to authenticate? (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm7.htm#rhose4 Rubber hose attack
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm7.htm#rhose5 when a fraud is a sale, Re: Rubber hose attack
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#risks credit card & gift card fraud (from today's comp.risks)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#tamper Limitations of limitations on RE/tampering (was: Re: biometrics)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#bio2 biometrics
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#44 Web site exposes credit card fraud
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#45 Web site exposes credit card fraud
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ansiepay.htm#breach Security breach raises questions about Internet shopping
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ansiepay.htm#scaads X9.59 related press release at smartcard forum
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#disputes Half of Visa's disputes, fraud result from I-commerce (more)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#x959risk2 Risk Management in AA / draft X9.59
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#smrtcrd Smart Cards with Chips encouraged ... fyi
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#fraud Online Card Fraud Thirty Times That Offline
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#ccfraud2 "out of control credit card fraud"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#ccfraud3 "out of control credit card fraud"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay8.htm#ccfraud Almost Half UK E-Shopper's Fear Card Fraud (CC fraud increased by 50% in 2k)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay8.htm#ccfraud2 Statistics for General and Online Card Fraud
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay8.htm#visapass VISA: All Your Password Are Belong to Us
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay8.htm#x959paper Credit Card Fraud and E-Commerce: A Case Study
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay9.htm#risks credit card & gift card fraud (from today's comp.risks)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay9.htm#skim High-tech Thieves Snatch Data From ATMs (including PINs)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#3 High-tech Thieves Snatch Data From ATMs (including PINs)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#6 credit card & gift card fraud (from today's comp.risks)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#16 Worker Accused of Selling Colleagues' ID's Online (credit card scam)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#19 Misc. payment, security, fraud, & authentication GAO reports (long posting)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#25 Definese Dept Criticised on Internal Credit Card Fraud
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#26 Definese Dept Criticised on Internal Credit Card Fraud
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#38 Credit card fraud sending night-vision rifle scope to criminal
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#41 ATM Scams - Whose Liability Is It, Anyway?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#44 Credit Card Skimming Rising In The US
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#73 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#40 Remove the name from credit cards!
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#68 Net banking, is it safe???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#22 Opinion on smartcard security requested
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#23 Opinion on smartcard security requested
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#41 Why?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#23 Opinion on smartcard security requested
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#40 Smart Cards
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#10 Least folklorish period in computing (was Re: IBM Mainframe at home)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#72 Biometrics not yet good enough?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#6 Biometric authentication for intranet websites?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#8 Biometric authentication for intranet websites?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#41 Biometric authentication for intranet websites?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#63 SSL integrity guarantees in abscense of client certificates
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Convenient and secure eCommerce using POWF Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 01:37:00 GMT"Ben Mord" writes:
note that there has been uptake of smartcards in other parts of the world with point-of-sale terminal support being deployed ... and the use of the cards at point-of-sale.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Convenient and secure eCommerce using POWF Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 05:52:00 GMT"Roger Schlafly" writes:
there is related issue with regard to intention and non-repudiation ... aka programs can be set-up to perform digital signature operations as means of authentication. however, that wouldn't be sufficient to equate a digital signature to a physical hand-written signature (since it usually is possible to show that when you write your signature, you actually intended to write your signature ... as opposed to performing some totally different operation).
recent finread & intention related posting:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#19 TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#24 Interests of online banks and their users [was Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM]
any signing card that can divulge your private key is hardly worth it ...
related aads chip strawman:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#aads
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Convenient and secure eCommerce using POWF Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 01:42:12 GMT"Ben Mord" writes:
also with usb plug&play other form factors things came into operation ... like USB dongles/key-fobs (not requiring a separate reader).
from an infrastructure investment standpoint there is the cross-over between consumer device and commercial point-of-sale device. for a time this seemed to be iso 7816 smartcards ... that have pos device deployment in various places in the world. one of the issues that has come up with high-traffic POS devices commercial settings is reliability and some migration started towards iso 14443 proximity cards (or 7816/14443 combo cards).
so there having been some initial problems with early deployment in a consumer setting of 7816 contact card readers (in part because of the pc/sc serial port issue) ... there is now some issue about whether there will be commercial migration to various wireless/contactless technologies; aka bluetooth, iso 14443 proximity, etc (or alternatively USB dongles). In which case, any significant additional investment in 7816 contact infrastructure at this point might be in question.
One possibility might be combo key-fob that does both USB as well as iso 14443 proximity.
In the bluetooth setting, one issue might be whether a lot of the individual card form factors get absorbed into a PDA or cellphone that supports multiple kinds of wireless operations (bluetooth, cellular, proximity, infrared, etc) ... rather than having a unique piece of plastic for every possible account ... each is defined in the PDA/cellphone.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Wanted: the SOUNDS of classic computing Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers,alt.sys.pdp10 Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 00:53:00 GMTfdc@columbia.edu (Frank da Cruz) writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: History of The Well was AOL Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 15:22:06 GMTJoel Gallun writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Wanted: the SOUNDS of classic computing Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers,alt.sys.pdp10 Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2002 17:32:26 GMTjcmorris@mitre.org (Joe Morris) writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: It is GNU/Linux, not just Linux Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2002 18:41:45 GMTcstacy@dtpq.com (Christopher C. Stacy) writes:
some lawyers have been trying to make the distinction that (physical) signing of a contract carries with it the idea that you intended to sign that contract as agreeing to the T&Cs specified ... as opposed to digital "signing" any (presumably) random bit of data as a means of authentication.
misc. public key threads:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#publickey
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Beware, Intel to embed digital certificates in Banias processors Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.sys.intel,comp.arch Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2002 21:22:55 GMT"Douglas A. Gwyn" writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Wanted: the SOUNDS of classic computing Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers,alt.sys.pdp10 Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 15:56:41 GMTAlan Greig writes:
when we were in the los gatos lab., some of the people there had worked on original ATM machine ... there was a vault built in the basement that use to have something like $50k of US twenties ... and also a lot of bills from couple dozen other countries.
That business was sold off ... I think to diebold ... but I don't remember for sure.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Encryption algorithm for stored data Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 16:10:27 GMTsomewhat related:
Call for Papers
First IEEE International Security In Storage Workshop
December 11th, 2002 -- Greenbelt, Maryland, USA
http://ieee-tfia.org/sisw2002
Sponsored by the
IEEE Computer Society Task Force on Information Assurance and the
IEEE Security In Storage Working Group
The ability to create large shared storage systems in a secure manner
is an area that has received little formal research or results. A
comprehensive, systems approach to storage security is required if
storage consolidation is to succeed. This workshop serves as an open
forum to discuss storage threats, technologies, methodologies and
deployment.
The workshop seeks submissions from academia and industry presenting
novel research on all theoretical and practical aspects of designing,
building and managing secure storage systems; possible topics include,
but are not limited to the following:
- Cryptographic Algorithms for Storage
- Cryptanalysis of Existing and Proposed Systems and Protocols
- Key Management for Storage Novel Implementations
- Attacks on Storage Area
- Networks and Storage Systems
- Insider Attack Countermeasures
- Standardization Approaches
- Deployment of Secure Storage Mechanisms
- Defining and Defending Trust Boundaries in Storage
- Security in Federated Systems
- Relating Storage Security to System and Network Security
- Security for Internet Storage Service Providers
The goal of the workshop is to disseminate new research, and to bring
together researchers and practitioners from both governmental and
civilian areas. Accepted papers will be published by IEEE Press in a
proceedings volume. Program Co-Chairs
- James Hughes (StorageTek, USA)
- Jack Cole (US Army Research Laboratory, USA)
Program Committee
- Donald Beaver (Seagate, USA)
- Randal Burns (Johns Hopkins University, USA)
- Richard Chow (USA)
- Peter Haas (University of Stuttgart, Germany)
- Yongdae Kim (University of Minnesota, USA)
- Ben Kobler (NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, USA)
- Fabio Maino (Andiamo Systems, USA)
- Ethan Miller (University of California Santa Cruz, USA)
- David McGrew (Cisco Systems, USA)
- Andrew Odlyzko (University of Minnesota, USA)
- Tatsuaki Okamoto (NTT, Japan)
- Jean-Jacques Quisquater (Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium)
- Pierangela Samarati (University of Milan, Italy)
- Rodney Van Meter (Nokia, USA)
Submissions
Papers must list all authors and affiliations, begin with a title, a
short abstract, a list of key words, and an introduction. The
introduction should summarize the contributions of the paper at a
level appropriate for a non-specialist reader. Papers may be submitted
in ASCII text, PostScript, PDF, HTML, or Microsoft Word.
Papers should be at most 15 pages in length including the
bibliography, figures, and appendices (using 10pt body text and
twocolumn layout). Authors are responsible for obtaining appropriate
clearances. Authors of accepted papers will be asked to sign
IEEEcopyright release forms. Final submissions must be in camera-ready
PostScript or PDF. Authors of accepted papers must guarantee that
their paper will be presented at the conference.
Papers that duplicate work that any of the authors have or will
publish elsewhere are acceptable for presentation at the
workshop. However, only original papers will be considered for
publication in the proceedings.
Important Dates
Paper due: October 11, 2002
Notification of acceptance: November 1, 2002
Final papers due: November 25, 2002
Workshop: December 11, 2002
Submissions and questions should be sent electronically to
James Hughes <jim@network.com>
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: updated security glossary/taxonomy Newsgroups: comp.security.misc Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 19:21:06 GMTi've updated security glossary/taxonomy
with quite a few additional entries from sc27 as well as glossary from a group that provides online references for one of the professional security certifications. The update of the taxonomy for the new entries is only partially completed ... so there will be additional changes over the next several days.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: History of The Well was AOL Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2002 02:50:16 GMTGiles Todd writes:
flat rate online netcom
came up with old posting
http://groups.google.com/groups?q=flat+rate+online+netcom&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&as_drrb=b&as_mind=1&as_minm=1&as_miny=1988&as_maxd=1&as_maxm=6&as_maxy=1990&selm=6966%40cbnewsh.ATT.COM&rnum=6
that had:
02/89 408-997-9119^ netcom San Jose CA 3/12/24/96 24 Unix System V --
Shell Access [Bourne, Korn, C-Shell], BBS, USENET, Languages: C, Lisp,
Prolog, Clips, (Ada soon), $10 / month, login as 'guest' no password.
Contact netcom!bobr.
as well as:
11/89 415-332-6106^ well Sausalito CA 12/24 24 6-processor Sequent
Balance (32032); UUCP and USENET access; multiple lines; access via
CPN; PICOSPAN BBS; $3/hour. Contact (415) 332-4335
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Help in Understanding requirement gathering, design, development & quality control Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2002 02:54:26 GMTjitudavda@hotmail.com (Jitu) writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft's innovations [was:the rtf format] Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 02 Oct 2002 19:19:02 GMTignatios@newton.cs.uni-bonn.de (Ignatios Souvatzis) writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft's innovations [was:the rtf format] Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 03 Oct 2002 00:23:22 GMT"Foobar T. Clown" writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft's innovations [was:the rtf format] Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 03 Oct 2002 14:04:12 GMTAnne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
http://www.romankoch.ch/capslock/minigmlscr.htm
MiniGML
A small GML formatter for your IBM PC or PS/2 Version 2.0
Document Number MINIGML.SCR
04/17/1987
Roman Koch
INS CC Zuerich
Operation
Mail: ICRKO01 at ZCHVM2
Preface
MiniGML is a small (less then 25 KB) and fast text formatting
program. lt accepts a subset of the GML (Generalized Markup Language)
starter set tags. MiniGML is a handy and simple way to process GML
documents in environments where diskette space or memory is
critical. MiniGML is not a replacement for other DCF/ GML formatters
like DWSCRIPT or SCRIPT/PC. For complex formatting tasks (indexing,
cross-references, conditional processing and so on), and for perfect
compatibility with your host GML, you will continue to use one of the
big ones.
====================
also found following list of ibm announcements from spring 1984 that mentions script/pc. the script product i was thinking about wasn't (originally?) an ibm offering
XENIX announced for the System/9000 machine (which was recently added to
IBM's product line - it's not IBM Instruments anymore)
PC/Videotex - Supports PCJr directly (I think), but PC and XT require
a Plantronics Colorplus or a MDS Realcolor graphics adapter
FORTRAN v2
- 8087 support, double precision, 4-byte integers,
overlays, 640K support, DOS 2 pathname support,
library manager provided, byte-aligned character variables
PASCAL v2
- 8087, 640K support, pathname support, librarian provided, etc.
Upgrade for existing FORTRAN or PASCAL user costs $100.00
PC SORT V 1
- Standalone or callable from COBOL
- Seems to have most features of mainframe sort/merge
Screen Print utility for the previously announced color printer
SCRIPT/PC
Plannercalc
ISPF/PC (aka EZ-VU) - 2 products, a runtime package and a
development package. Provides dialogue management services
for BASIC, PASCAL, FORTRAN, etc.
PCJR Color Display
Datamaster-like PCWriter
2 Flavors of Displaywriter-like WP software - big one is
similar to Textpack 4, and can interchange documents with it
IBM 5218 Printer - finally, an IBM logo letter quality printer -
optional sheet and envelope feeders, can be shared among up to
4 PCs through an option, software to drive it converts IBM Graphic
printer orders into appropriate sequences for the 5218, listed as
fully compatible with WordStar, PeachText, and todays announcements
Ability to directly attach PC and Displaywriter, and to put the
Displaywriter on a PC Cluster (through a PC).
DisplayComm BSC program - Provides BSC 2780 etc emulation, but
also allows document interchange with Displaywriter, 6670 (imagine,
a PC driving a 6670!), a 5520, and other office systems
--
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Authentication of others is a privilege, not a right Newsgroups: alt.computer.security Date: Fri, 04 Oct 2002 00:37:47 GMT"Mark Guzowski" writes:
i would claim that anybody could do authentication ... which in a relatively simple form is the person that i believe i'm talking to ... really that person. this can be as simple as the dollar bill torn in half ... a person can proove that they are the person that sent me half a torn dollar bill by presenting the other half; this doesn't involve identification ... it just involves authentication.
i go into a bank and deposit a million dollars ... and the bank gives me a card and a secret password for authenticated access to that million dollars. other than various gov. requirements ... the card and password would be sufficient for authenticated access ... no identification is required.
misc. refs for authentication and identification are in the merged
security glossary at:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#glossary
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft's innovations Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 04 Oct 2002 14:21:50 GMTjmfbahciv writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Beware, Intel to embed digital certificates in Banias processors Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.sys.intel,comp.arch Date: Fri, 04 Oct 2002 14:42:40 GMTwrites:
however, the financial (and other) infrastructures for (at least)
privacy and liability reasons went to something called
relying-party-only certificates that typically contain only an account
number and a public key. for these purposes it is possible to show
that such certificates are redundant and superfluous ... and typically
only exist for compatibility reasons with easily available COTS
digital signature support software. misc. recent posts on r.p.o.
certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#27 Employee Certificates - Security Issues
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#28 Employee Certificates - Security Issues
also
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#rpo
within the general context of binding any information to a public key ... it could be as simple as type of processor or type of operation system. the certificate could be totally privacy agnostic ... something like the stored value cards that you can purchase at large number of retail, grocery store, etc. check-out counters.
NOTE that within the current structure of payment card retail
financial transactions ... they are essentially unauthenticated ...
as a result the account number effectively becomes a shared-secret.
many of the vulnerabilities are related to the fact that the account
number is a shared-secret but at a large number of processing points
it must be available ... and therefor it is available for fraudulent
purposes ... various posts related to this:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#fraud
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#61 Security Proportional To Risk
the charter given the x9a10 standards working group was to preserve
the integrity of the financial infrastructure for all retail
transactions. the x9.59 standard
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#x959
defines authenticated transaction and removes the account number from the category of a shared-secret ... aka the account number can be publically broadcast and it would still not be possible to perform a fraudulent transaction. part of the issue is that the account number is required in the clear in so many places ... that it was effectively impossible to keep in secret; so the solution was to remove the necessity of keeping it secret.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Microsoft's innovations Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sun, 06 Oct 2002 13:00:45 GMTSteve O'Hara-Smith writes:
this perculated into things like the waterloo versions as well as all the PC versions.
misc:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#54 Microsoft's innovations
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The next big things that weren't Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 07 Oct 2002 19:27:47 GMT"x" writes:
... part way down the posting is a list of announcements from 1987 mentioning
the s/9000 ... aka
XENIX announced for the System/9000 machine (which was recently added
to IBM's product line - it's not IBM Instruments anymore)
also from original announcement:
IBM Instruments Inc (Danbury, Ct.) has announced on Monday 4/26/82 a
Motorola 68000 based MICROCOMPUTER named ADVENTURE. Preliminary
specifications are:
1) Base system consisting of
a) a box containing a planar board + 5 additional slots
-Planar board has: 128 kbytes of ram, prom resident operating
system, 5 1/4 in floppy controller, 1 IEEE-488 port,
3 serial ports (RS 232), 3 timers (2 Mhz), 1 parallel port
b) Crt (bw, apa, 768480 resolution)
c) a function keypad (not key board)
2) Prices start at $ 5695 for the base system. Options include:
Keyboard (same as PC) 270; 4 color printer-plotter 2095
Sensor board (A/D; Di/do) 850; Floppy drive (2 8in) 2478
Hard disk controller/Drive 3900; 1 mb ram board 4100
Basic 195; Assembler/linker/editor 155
3) First customer ship date 10/82
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The next big things that weren't Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 07 Oct 2002 20:39:32 GMTJoachim Pense writes:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#42 Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#45 Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation
using search engine on pl/i seems to still come up with quite a few
hits ... so it can't have disappeared totally.
http://www.faqs.org/faqs/computer-lang/pli-faq/
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The next big things that weren't Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Tue, 08 Oct 2002 14:07:26 GMT"David Wade" writes:
random past gosip refs:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#114 What is the use of OSI Reference Model?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#115 What is the use of OSI Reference Model?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#23 10 choices that were critical to the Net's success
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#setjava javasoft SET - NO!
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#0 "Mainframe" Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#59 7 layers to a program
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#79 "Database" term ok for plain files?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#16 The author Ronda Hauben fights for our freedom.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#43 Al Gore: Inventing the Internet...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#63 Is Al Gore The Father of the Internet?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#70 When the Internet went private
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#17 Pre ARPAnet email?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#32 Blame it all on Microsoft
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#5 YKYGOW...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#6 YKYGOW...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#21 Why did OSI fail compared with TCP-IP?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#30 Why did OSI fail compared with TCP-IP?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#15 Al Gore and the Internet
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The next big things that weren't Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Tue, 08 Oct 2002 16:08:29 GMTRoland Hutchinson writes:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#10 Taligent
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#42 IBM's Workplace OS (Was: .. Pink)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#45 IBM's Workplace OS (Was: .. Pink)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#46 Where are they now : Taligent and Pink
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#48 Where are they now : Taligent and Pink
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#32 Whom Do Programmers Admire Now???
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The next big things that weren't Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Tue, 08 Oct 2002 20:26:09 GMThaynes@alumni.uark.edu (Jim Haynes) writes:
later during the hpcc period in the early '90s, i believe it was one
of the people supplying hardware to the test bed at LLNL that coined
the term "information utility".
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#20 Disk caching and file systems. Disk history...people forget
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The next big things that weren't Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 09 Oct 2002 15:21:40 GMTJoe Pfeiffer writes:
370/165/168 TLB was 4-way set associative ... 128 entries, 7 address space deep. virtual address bits were used to select group of 4 entries .... and then the 4 entries were checked for both address space match as well as virtual address match.
for some other refs do search engine on content addressable in addition to associative
one past ref:
IXM2: A Parallel Associative Processor,
1991 Proc. ACM SIGARCH,
Higuchi T., Furuya T., Handa K., Takahashi N., Nishiyama N., and
Kokubu A.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: IBM Announcement Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Wed, 09 Oct 2002 19:25:46 GMTGreg Pfister writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: SSL certificate modification Newsgroups: comp.security.misc Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 13:55:01 GMTHenrick Hellström writes:
an issue is that certification authorities that issue SSL domain name server certificates have to check with the authoritative agency for domain names ... when they get an application for certification. Their problem is that the authoritative agency for domain names is the domain name infrastructure .... the very same domain name infrastructure with integrity issues that gave rise to the jistification for certificates in the first place.
some of the enhancements to the domain name infrastructure (to improve its integrity) needed by certification authorities (so they can trust the certified information) include things like the owner of a domain name registering their public key at the some time they register the domain name.
in any case, enhancements to the domain name infrastructure to improve the integrity and trust (for purposes of the certification authority market) also goes a long way to improving the integrity and trust for everybody. Improving the integrity and trust of the domain name infrastructure for everybody also negates much of the requirement for needing SSL domain name server certificates (sort of a catch-22, isn't it).
Furthermore, one of the solutions from the certification authorities to have public keys registered as part of domain name registrtation means that a trusted domain name infrastructure can serve up trusted public keys in the same way that they would serve up trusted ip-addresses.
The implementation of domain name infrastructure already supports serving up arbritrary information, not just domain names -> ip-addresses. Such an infrastructure would result in near real-time trusted public keys bound to domain names (as well as any other information that might be of interested) as opposed to the method of stale trustetd information implemented by (the now redundant and superfluous) SSL domain name server certificates.
random refs:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#sslcerts
--
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: SSL certificate modification Newsgroups: comp.security.misc Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 21:04:41 GMTHenrick Hellström writes:
aka that the CA requirement for improving domain name infrastructure by having the domain name infrastructure register public keys at the same time they register the domain name:
1) improves the integrity of the domain name infrastructure so that the CAs can trust the information ... but if the CAs can trust the information ... then other people can trust the information ... by implication then the domain name infrastructure is a trusted server ... a catch-22 that eliminates the main reason for having SSL domain name certificates ... aka i've actually heard of real situations involving domain name take over and impersonation, i have yet to hear of a situation of real actual a significant mitm attacks.
2) if public keys are registered as part of #1 ... and also by #1 the domain name infrastructure is a trusted server ... then the existing domain name infrastructure can to trusted, near real time serving of public keys ... which is significantly better than the stale information paradigm implemented with certificates. as noted previously ... the domain name infrastructure is implemented to serve up general information ... not just ip-addresses.
not mentioned in the previous posting, that with the ability to obtain both the real trusted ip-address and the trusted public key in a single operation ... there can be a reduction in the SSL protocol handshaking chatter as part of setting up a session. The client as part of the original contact to the server ... include a SSL setup request piggybacked with the random session key (encrypted with the the server's public key) and the acceptable symmetric algorithms. The server responds with its choice of algorithm and the number of bits used from the random session key and everything else encrypted with the random session key. In theory, the SSL session could be setup and running in a single round trip.
a) trusted public key obtained in the same domain name infrastructure transaction that is already performed to obtain the ip-address. this is near real-time status ... and doesn't suffer the shortcomings of stale credential information that may need some sort of CRL broadcast to invalidate information aka current SSL domain name certificates aren't a real PKI infrastructure since it lacks the management of revoked/changed information ... say something like periodic broadcasts of CRLs to all possible browsers in the world.
b) since the client already has the server's public key prior to contacting the server ... SSL session setup chatter might be reduced to single round-trip ... piggybacked as part of the initial session setup.
as before .... (numerous) other postings with these observations:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#sslcerts
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Tweaking old computers? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 13:55:03 GMTab528@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Heinz W. Wiggeshoff) writes:
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Tweaking old computers? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 14:18:31 GMTab528@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Heinz W. Wiggeshoff) writes:
The 3081 originally came out in two processor smp version only and no non-shared memory, single processor version. This somewhat assumed that all operating systems had SMP support. However, there was a very performance sensitive operating system that still didn't have SMP support ... ACP/TPF used by many airline res sysetms and various financial transaction networks. While ACP/TPF had loosely-coupled (aka cluster support) ... it liked tighly-coupled multiprocessor support.
ACP/TPF running on a 3081 was only able to make use of a single processor. Frequently, they might run VM on the 3081 and then run two (or more) copies of ACP/TPF to more fully use the processing power.
Note that the 3081 wasn't a traditional IBM SMP ... where a two-processor configuration could be cleaved into two fully functional uniprocessors, each with full set of components, power supplies, i/o, etc. The 3081 was a single box, with effectively a single set of components and two processors. It wasn't possible to partition a 3081 into two fully functional uniprocessors (other than the software partitioning provided by VM) ... each running 15 percent faster (with the inter-cache chatter protocol turned off).
Eventually a uniprocessor was produced ... 3083 (primarily for the acp/tpf market) which was a single processor running 15 percent faster (because the inter-cache chatter protocol was disabled).
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Tweaking old computers? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 14:40:52 GMTab528@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Heinz W. Wiggeshoff) writes:
370-168 and 370-158 had a number of things done .... one was main memory was upgraded to 4xx(?)ns main memory (aka storage was better than four times faster).
other data point (at least for 168), the microcode & hardware implementing 370 instruction set was significantly reworked such that the avg. machine cycles per 370 instruction was dropped from 2.1 (on 165) to 1.6 (on 168) ... the basic machine/cache cycle time for both stayed the same ... but the combination of faster memory and better optimized microcode implementing 370 instruction set ... made the 168 a much faster machine.
both the 135 & 145 shipped with virtual memory support from the start but was disabled until the virtual memory announcement ... which was significantly gated getting the 165 virtual memory hardware upgrade designed and built. when the virtual memory announcement was made, there was a new microcode load for the machines that enabled virtual memory mode. There is the famous(?) story about customers asking at share what the "xlat" light met aka the 145 had several rows of lights with varous (physically printed) labels. One light (on all 145 shipped to customers, even before virtual memory was announced) had label that customers strongly suspected was short for "translation" ... aka virtual address translation mode.
the 135/145 had upgrades to 138/148 both were new hardware. 138/148
(virgil/tully) also had m'code accelerators for VS1 and VM. The
15x/16x were horizontal m'code machines where you talk about
avg. machine cycles per instruction. The smaller machines were
vertical m'code machines where there was something like 10:1 ratio of
vertical m'code instructions for every 370 instruction (aka a .5mip
370 machine needed a 5mip microprocessor). The m'code accelerators for
VS1 and VM effectively dropped highly used operating system paths into
the m'code ... nominally seeing a 10:1 speedup.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#21 370 ECPS microcode assit
at least the 148 also had significant speedup in floating point ... possibly on the order of 3 to 5 times(?) that of 145.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: End to Moore's law and job market : conclusion Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 15:06:56 GMTPeter Boyle writes:
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Tweaking old computers? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 20:00:19 GMTCharles Richmond writes:
this was to address business scenarios where the technical people attempted to convince their management that not filling a drive completely full was more cost effective (because of reduced arm contention and improved overall system thruput) ... and otherwise failed to make the case. it was important (from a management perspective) that these "faster" drives cost more.
the only difference was a change in the microcode load.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: The next big things that weren't Newsgroups: comp.arch,comp.society.futures,rec.arts.sf.science,soc.history.science,alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2002 19:28:51 GMTkyle_jones@wonderworks.com (Kyle Jones) writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Whatever happened to C2 "Orange Book" Windows security? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2002 19:24:19 GMT"Daniel P. B. Smith" writes:
The orange book was orientated towards certification of general purpose systems ... lots of the things that are required would make it impossible for many network connected things.
common criteria in many ways is trying to provide security certifications for things that would be effectively impossible to certify as a general purpose system under the orange book. Basically you can environmentally targeted protection profiles under common criteria .... instead of a generalized certification standard for everything ... you have protection profile certification standard for specific things (firewalls, smartcards, etc).
In the case of the firewall, you can claim that even if it is built from general purpose platform, only a very restricted subset of things are actually configured and it is then only necessary to specify/certify just the firewall environment. A firewall might never have been able to get an acceptable certification under the orange book as a generalized computing system... but could using a common criteria firewall protection profile.
There is also some latitude in being able to specify what pieces/functions that a certification applies to. There has been a joke that one of the published smartcard certifications ... which didn't publish the certification criteria ... might have only requested that the plastic card manufacturing quality be certified and the criteria never actually specified anything about the chip in the card. Other certifications are gotten for baseline chip with little, if any software.
I've recently been involved in getting a EAL4-high certification for chipcard. I had looked at EAL5-high for full lifecycle with all (including crypto) applications ... but turned out to be really breaking new ground
random recent refs:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#10 Opinion on smartcard security requested
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#17 Smart Cards
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#82 formal fips186-2/x9.62 definition for eal 5/6 evaluation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#84 formal fips186-2/x9.62 definition for eal 5/6 evaluation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#86 formal fips186-2/x9.62 definition for eal 5/6 evaluation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#35 ... certification
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#44 Beware, Intel to embed digital certificates in Banias
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#13 anybody seen (EAL5) semi-formal specification for FIPS186-2/x9.62 ecdsa?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#14 Challenge to TCPA/Palladium detractors
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#19 TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: VLSI and "the real world" Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2002 19:48:28 GMT"del cecchi" writes:
370 "data streaming" extended that to 400 feet aggregate and from max. data rate of 1.5mbytes/sec to 3mbytes/sec. 360 had synchronous handshake per byte, 370 stretched that to 8 bytes. It wasn't until 3380s that there were significant devices doing 3mbyte/sec transfer.
there were exceptions ... latency sensitive devices in conjunction with channels that had high command processing latency ... combination of 2305 fixed head disk and 370/158 channel had aggregate of 80 feet.
random:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#5 360 "channels" and "multiplexers"?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#38 How to learn assembler language for OS/390 ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#75 Does the word "mainframe" still have a meaning?></pre>
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#59 Disks size growing while disk count shrinking = bad performance
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#28 checking some myths.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#7 Bus & Tag, possible length/distance?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#7 Blade architectures
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#33 ESCON Distance Limitations - Why ?
when i was undergradudate (long ago and far away) i got to work on
project that included reverse engineering 360 channel interface to
build supposedly first pcm controller:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#360pcm
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: InfiniBand Performance (Hey Pfister!) Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2002 20:00:08 GMTnmm1@cus.cam.ac.uk (Nick Maclaren) writes:
one of these trade-offs is the (limited number) segment register design in ROMP & RIOS. The original assumption was that inline application could change segment registers as easily as it could change any other general or floating point register ... mitigating the issue of the limited amount of addressed space at any one moment (in much the same way that an application can change addresses in general purpose registerd).
the problem came when the ROMP/displaywriter project was killed and the group scambled to remake themselves as a unix workstation. All of a sudden the assumptions about inline trusted code went out the door and kernel calls (and associated overhead) were introduced for managing privileges/trust.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: New Book Newsgroups: comp.arch Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2002 20:20:12 GMTseebs@plethora.net (Peter Seebach) writes:
there is some question about these being simulators or emulators.
note that this isn't actually too different than the majority of the 360/370 mainframes .... very few were actually hardwired machines. The majority of 360/370 were some processor with programming prividing the 360/370 ISA.
The higher end 370 machines (155, 158, 165, 168, 303x) were horizontal microcoded machines ... and 370 efficiency was typically rated in avg. machine cycles per 370 instruction (aka one of the changes from 165 to 168 was improvements in microcode with reduction from 2.1cycles/instruction to 1.6cycles/instruction).
The lower end 370 machines (115, 125, 135, 145 and descendants) were much more like traditional vertical programmed microprocessors. They tended to avg. 10 microprocessor instructions per 370 instruction (which is comparable to some of the current offerings that run on i86 processors). The net was that for say a .3mip 370 machine, a 3mip microprocessor was required.
Long ago, for the 138/148 enhancements to 135/145 there was a project
that translated about 6000 bytes of critical 370 kernel code into
6000 bytes of microprocessor code that got a 10:1 speedup.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#21 370 ECPS microcode assist
there has been some threads in ibm mainframe groups about ibm getting out of the low & midrange 390 cpu marketing ... and the only things some customers are left with (other than moving to a different architecture) is some of these simulators/emulators.
random res:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#11 I'm overwhelmed
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#17 I'm overwhelmed
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#61 VM (not VMS or Virtual Machine, the IBM sort)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#35 What level of computer is needed for a computer to Love?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#6 virtualizable 360, was TSS ancient history
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#7 360/370 instruction cycle time
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#27 VM/SP sites that allow free access?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#22 Hercules, OCO, and IBM missing a great opportunity
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#31 Hercules etc. IBM not just missing a great opportunity...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#32 Hercules etc. IBM not just missing a great opportunity...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#34 Hercules etc. IBM not just missing a great opportunity...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#37 Hercules etc. IBM not just missing a great opportunity...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#67 Hercules etc. IBM not just missing a great opportunity...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002b.html#44 PDP-10 Archive migration plan
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#42 Beginning of the end for SNA?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#4 IBM Mainframe at home
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#61 GE 625/635 Reference + Smart Hardware
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#31 : Re: AS/400 and MVS - clarification please
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#63 Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#64 Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#69 Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#76 HONE was .. Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#79 Fw: HONE was .. Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#0 HONE was .. Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#1 HONE was .. Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#2 HONE was .. Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#6 HONE was .. Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#37 HONE was .. Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#48 SHARE Planning
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Whatever happened to C2 "Orange Book" Windows security? Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2002 20:31:24 GMTcbh@ieya.co.REMOVE_THIS.uk (Chris Hedley) writes:
the historical evaluated products list:
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/epl/historical.html
some other refs:
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/tpep.html
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/whatsnew.html
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/